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I.

INTRODUCTION

Theoretical debates about the nature of the corporation have
raged for over a century, with competing understandings of the corporation holding sway in different regulatory arenas and each view
1
making competing claims for normative supremacy. Far less atten2
tion has been devoted to the nature of the corporate group. This is
perhaps surprising given the dominance of corporate groups in the
global economy and the challenges they pose to traditional legal systems and governance structures.
A number of ready explanations for this inattention to the corporate group come from within corporate law itself. First, contemporary understandings of the firm as a “nexus of contracts” encompass
both individual corporate entities and large corporate groups equal3
ly. Because the corporate group is viewed simply as the aggregation
1
Numerous sources survey the primary positions. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah,
Citizens United & the Corporate Form, 999 WIS. L. REV. 999 (2010); Morton J. Horwitz,
Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173 (1985);
David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201 (1990); Michael J. Phillips, How Much Does Corporate Theory Matter? A Response to Professor Boatright, 34 AM.
BUS. L.J. 239 (1996). Early contributions include John Dewey, The Historical Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655 (1926); Harold J. Laski, The Personality of Associations, 29 HARV. L. REV. 404 (1916); Arthur W. Machen, Jr., Corporate
Personality, 24 HARV. L. REV. 253 (1911); see also infra Part II.
2
This is not, however, the case beyond corporate law. A rich body of literature
on corporate groups exists within management theory and organizational studies,
and regulatory scholars also have wrestled with the problem of enterprise or group
liability. See, e.g., infra Part II.A., C. (drawing on this scholarship). Notable contributions within corporate law include the work of Phillip Blumberg, Peter Muchlinski,
Janet Dine, and Larry Catá Backer. See, e.g., PHILLIP BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL
CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW CORPORATE PERSONALITY
(1993); JANET DINE, THE GOVERNANCE OF CORPORATE GROUPS (2000); PETER T.
MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW (1995); Larry Catá Backer,
The Autonomous Global Corporation: On the Role of Organizational Law Beyond Asset Partitioning and Legal Personality, 41 TUL. L. REV. 541 (2006); Phillip Blumberg, The Increasing Recognition of Entity Principles in Determining Parent and Subsidiary Corporation Liabilities, 28 CONN. L. REV. 295 (1996).
3
See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF
CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985); see also FRANK H.
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of its constituent entities, there is little need in corporate law for rules
concerning the internal “contracts” among the entities comprising
the corporate group or for rules directed at the corporate group as a
4
whole. Such rules are confined largely to select doctrinal arenas,
such as veil-piercing and majority shareholder duties. In addition,
corporate law in the United States does not recognize the corporate
group as a separate legal entity form, nor has the United States
5
adopted a federal incorporation approach. As a result, the organization and internal affairs of each corporation, regardless of its place in
a larger “corporate family,” are governed separately by the law of the
6
jurisdiction where it is incorporated.
Another explanation is that the scope of corporate law is limited
to enabling efficient implicit or explicit contracts among the contributors to the corporate enterprise. It is therefore “private” rather than
7
“public” law. Unless current corporate law rules are impeding efficient contracting within or among corporate groups, further regard
for the nature of the corporate group is unnecessary. The nature of
corporate groups, on the other hand, becomes relevant primarily in
8
public policy debates about “corporate power.” Yet setting bounds
on corporate conduct is more clearly the task of other areas of law,
such as antitrust, environmental, labor, consumer protection, or tax

EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW
12−13 (1991) (applying contractual theories of the firm to conglomerates and other
corporate groups).
4
See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976); see also
W. RICHARD SCOTT & GERALD F. DAVIS, ORGANIZATIONS AND ORGANIZING: RATIONAL,
NATURAL, AND OPEN SYSTEM PERSPECTIVES 232 (2006) (observing that Jensen and
Meckling’s contractual vision of the firm does not distinguish “internal” contracts
within a particular corporation or corporate group from “external” contracts with
third parties; both are contracts for inputs and outputs of the firm).
5
But see infra note 27 and accompanying text (introducing comparative perspectives).
6
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 302–10 (1971) (regarding jurisdiction over the corporation’s “internal affairs”).
7
See generally Millon, supra note 1 (discussing the public-private tension and its
influence on theories of the corporation). Millon ultimately asserts that “corporate
law is public law.” Id. at 261; see also KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE
LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS & PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 29–39 (2006) (arguing for a
vision of “corporate law as public law”).
8
It is no accident that much of the debate over the nature and purpose of the
corporation had its origin in the 1930s, when the influence of corporations on society began to grow. See discussion infra Part II.B.
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9

law—not corporate law. Indeed, many regulatory regimes addressing corporate activity in the United States already extend their reach
beyond the bounds of a single corporation to the corporate group,
10
and, in some cases, even extraterritorially.
At base, perhaps, is the sense that there is little value in theorizing about corporate groups. The skeptic might argue that if historical controversies over the nature of the corporation are any guide,
their application to corporate groups may well have little bearing on
actual business practice or on how courts decide cases where corpo11
rate obligations are in dispute. This Article challenges these contentions.
Beginning from established theories of the firm, Part II extends
standard views of corporate personhood to develop alternative theories of corporate groups. Conceptions of the firm within the field of
economics are invaluable in explaining the origins of corporate struc12
tures and, indeed, the evolution of corporate groups. However, not
all legal rules, whether from a liability, regulatory, or governance
standpoint, that fit the unitary corporate entity can be applied easily
to the corporate group—as the proliferation of regulations directed
13
at corporate groups attests. Acknowledging these differences as a
matter of law requires perspectives of the corporate group that recognize their complex organizational structure and diversity as well as
standards for identifying where, as a matter of legal doctrine, differences between the firm as a single entity and the firm as a complex
organization matter. Yet existing theories of corporate personhood
have been articulated and interpreted largely at the level of a simple
14
unitary organization.
Much of the attention directed toward corporate groups by corporate law scholars has focused on veil piercing doctrine and the application of limited liability at the enterprise level, within or across
15
the corporate group. This Article does not challenge these principles. Instead, it argues that alternative theories of the corporate

9

See, e.g., Daniel Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV.
1259, 1271–74 (1982). But see GREENFIELD, supra note 7, at 29–32 (critiquing this
view).
10
See infra notes 110–12 and accompanying text (surveying these regulations).
11
See infra notes 147–52 and accompanying text (introducing these views).
12
See sources cited supra note 3.
13
See infra notes 110–12 and accompanying text (surveying these regulations).
14
See infra notes 94–97 and accompanying text.
15
See infra Part II.C.1.
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group may lead to different legal rules and case outcomes even if existing limited liability rules are assumed.
This Article also responds to the broader critique that theories
of corporate personhood are of little practical moment, whether
from a positive or a normative standpoint. In fact, in two successive
terms, the Supreme Court has had opportunity to consider several
cases where the courts’ (and legislatures’) understandings of the corporation and of corporate groups played a foundational role. Part II
of this Article weighs the normative implications of theories of the
corporate group and what they contribute to evolving conceptions of
corporate accountability. Part III of this Article then illustrates the
utility of these theories by applying them in an analysis of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Citizens United v. FEC, decided in
16
early 2010, Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, decided
17
in June 2011, and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., a case now
18
pending before the Court. This analysis sheds light on some of the
inconsistencies and weaknesses within these cases that closer attention to the corporate group might have clarified and suggests how alternative theoretical perspectives of the corporate group matter to
case outcomes.
The evidence presented here from a range of doctrinal arenas
confirms that no one theoretical approach is likely to be predictive of
case outcomes, nor is there a single approach that offers the “best”
normative guide for courts and regulators in all doctrinal domains.
Accordingly, the argument made here is not for convergence in perspectives on corporate groups across all areas of the law. Rather, it is
that in different areas of the law, theories of the corporation, and, by
extension, of corporate groups can be used to evaluate or legitimate
19
particular legal rules. In this effort, the conception of corporate
groups that is optimal (and indeed the normative goal defining what
“optimal” means) must be determined in light of the policy objectives
motivating that area of the law and the realities of corporate prac-

16

130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).
18
621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (U.S. Oct. 17,
2011) (No. 10-1491).
19
See generally Horwitz, supra note 1, at 176 (demonstrating the influence of legal
theory on the evolution and legitimacy of legal rules that permitted the emergence
of “big business”). On the legitimating function of corporate theory, see also Millon,
supra note 1, at 241−43 (critiquing Horwitz and noting that the relationship between
legal theory and social practice is, in fact, interdependent, such that practice can also
legitimate one theory over another).
17
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20

tice. There is therefore an even greater need for an analysis of multiple perspectives since explicit recognition of the differences among
potential approaches is the best route to greater predictability within
discrete areas of the law.
To guide such choices, Part IV proposes a preliminary framework for identifying which approach offers the best foundation upon
which alternative visions of the corporate group may lead to different
legal rules or case outcomes. This analysis emphasizes the ways in
which conceptions of the personhood of the corporation and, by extension, of corporate groups, have direct bearing on critical policy
choices regarding corporate rights and duties, power, and voice.
II. FROM THEORIES OF THE CORPORATION TO THEORIES OF
CORPORATE GROUPS
One of the fundamental defining characteristics of the corporation is that it constitutes a separate legal person with rights and obli21
gations distinct from those of its owners. Although this basic propo22
sition is nearly universally recognized worldwide, considerable
controversy, within which the Supreme Court has recently become
embroiled, surrounds notions of corporate personhood.
Rarely within this debate, however, have commentators considered how questions of corporate personhood play out in the context
of the corporate group. Despite the fact that many regulatory regimes in the United States and elsewhere now approach the corpo-

20

This conclusion is in line with earlier observations by Philip Blumberg. See
BLUMBERG, supra note 2, at 120 (“Enterprise law . . . reflects very different considerations as the nature of the fundamental jurisprudential problem before the court
changes . . . . [A]nd it is foolish to expect that any consistent or transcendental body
of jurisprudence will emerge. The choice between enterprise principles and entity
law will reflect the values and interests at stake and the fundamental nature of the
[decision presented to] the court.”).
21
The defining features of the corporate form are legal personality, limited liability for owners and managers, shared ownership by investors of capital, delegation
of management under a board structure, and transferability of shares. Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439,
439–40 (2001); see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 11 (“Sometimes it is
said that the distinctive features of the corporation are limited liability, legal identity,
and perpetual existence . . . .”).
22
See, e.g., DAVID MILMAN, NATIONAL CORPORATE LAW IN A GLOBALISED MARKET 60–
61 (2009) (“This is a sine qua non of any corporate law model.” (citing recognition of
this principle by courts in both common and civil law jurisdictions, as well as by international courts)); Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 21, at 439–40 (observing
that full legal personality is one of the “core functional features of [the corporate
form that] were essentially identical” worldwide by the end of the nineteenth century).
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23

rate group as a single economic enterprise, the question of what the
corporation actually “is” continues to be analyzed as if the typical
business entity were a single closely held private corporation. In actuality, of course, for decades the corporate group has been the predominant form of business organization for all but the smallest busi24
nesses. Most major public corporations are in fact part of corporate
groups that contain hundreds or even thousands of affiliated compa25
nies around the world.
This Article takes these complex corporate organizations as its
focus. This Part first introduces the primary understandings of corporate personhood that have been advanced over the past century
and then extends them to corporate groups. It begins by introducing
some of the core concepts that are essential to the discussion.
A. Defining the “Corporate Group”
Defining the corporation itself is of course fairly simple—it is a
legal entity possessing the characteristics defined by the corporate law
of its state of incorporation, or if beyond the United States, by the law
26
of the jurisdiction in which it is formed. Although what constituencies together form the “corporation” is at times unclear, state corporate law, the terms of the corporate charter, and other contractual
mechanisms establish the corporation as a separate legal person and
delimit its formal boundaries.
Defining the corporate group is a more complicated exercise.
In Germany and France, the corporate group is a distinct entity form
27
governed by its own body of law. In the United States, however,
there is no entity form corresponding to the corporate group, nor is
28
there a uniform definition. For convenience, academic commenta23

See infra text accompanying notes 109−112.
David Sugarman, Corporate Groups in Europe: Governance, Industrial Organization,
and Efficiency in a Post-Modern World, in REGULATING CORPORATE GROUPS IN EUROPE 13,
20 (David Sugarman & Gunther Teubner eds., 1990).
25
For a more complete discussion of multinational enterprises, see infra Part
III.C.
26
See supra note 21 (discussing these fundamental characteristics).
27
See DINE, supra note 2, at 57–59 (describing the German “Konzernrecht”); JOSÉ
ENGRÁCIA ANTUNES ET AL., REPORT OF THE REFLECTION GROUP ON THE FUTURE OF EU
COMPANY
LAW
59
(2011),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/reflectiongroup_rep
ort_en.pdf (surveying current practice within the European Union). The European
Commission is currently considering whether to adopt uniform rules for corporate
groups. See generally id. at 59–76.
28
See, e.g., Sugarman, supra note 24, at 25 (discussing the complexities surrounding this basic definitional issue).
24
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tors and the courts use generic terms, such as the firm, the company,
and even the corporation to refer to the corporate group.
At the outset, any effort to define the corporate group must
begin by acknowledging that both the “corporation” and the “corporate group” are “firms” in the Coasian sense. That is, both are economic organizations that emerge when organizing production internally is less costly than coordinating transactions through market ex29
exchange. In other words, the corporate form or “hierarchy” is an
30
alternative to markets. The economic boundaries of the firm as an
enterprise need not, and indeed, frequently do not, however, corre31
spond in any transparent way to its legal boundaries.
The key defining characteristic of a corporate group is typically
common ownership. The prototypical corporate group includes a
parent company and its direct and indirect subsidiaries, each with a
32
separate legal identity and its own legal rights and obligations. Assets of the corporate group may be held in trusts, special purpose vehicles, and other separate legal entities owned by one or more mem33
bers of the corporate group. The corporate group may, and in fact
29
Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 393 (1937) (defining a firm as “the system of relationships which comes into existence when the direction of resources is dependent on an entrepreneur” rather than on the price mechanism); see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 8 (defining the “firm” simply
as “an aggregation of people banded together for a longer period,” as compared to
the short-term economic transactions that define a “market); SCOTT & DAVIS, supra
note 4, at 221–25 (explaining transaction cost theory and the origin of firms); Harold Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 141 (1988).
30
See generally WILLIAMSON, supra note 3 (applying a transaction cost analysis to
explain the emergence of organizational hierarchies as an alternative to markets). See
also OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS (1975) (exploring the role of market failure in the rise of organizational hierarchy and of organizational failure in the assignment of economic activity to
the market).
31
See generally Edward M. Iacobucci & George G. Triantis, Economic and Legal
Boundaries of Firms, 93 VA. L. REV. 515 (2007).
32
See, e.g., BLUMBERG, supra note 2, at 247 (“[S]tock ownership or control is the
wellspring of ‘control’ in corporate groups . . . .”); DINE, supra note 2, at 40. This is
the definition adopted by one of the few U.S. statutes that incorporates the term,
“corporate group.” See 12 C.F.R. § 32.5(c), (d)(1)–(2) (2011) (defining bank lending limits that apply to the “corporate group,” defined based on majority equity ownership by one entity of another, and distinguishing other “common enterprises,”
which may arise, inter alia, if borrowers “are related directly or indirectly through
common control” or are financially interdependent).
33
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271(c) (2012) (defining assets of a “subsidiary”
to include those of “any entity wholly-owned and controlled, directly or indirectly by
the corporation, . . . [including] without limitation, corporations, partnerships, limited partnerships, limited liability partnerships, limited liability companies, and / or
statutory trusts”).
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typically does, include limited liability companies (LLCs) and other
34
entities that are not formally corporations. Corporate groups can
therefore be seen as “hybrid arrangements between contract and organization,” having a “paradoxical character of multiplicity and uni35
ty.”
Common equity ownership is not the only way for firms to enjoy
the benefits of cooperative economic activity. As sociologists John
Scott and Gerald Davis point out: “Between market (arm’s length exchange) and hierarchy (vertical integration) lie a range of alternative
means of governing exchanges that may be less costly, including hierarchical contracting . . . joint operating agreements, or other hybrid
36
forms,” including franchisees, distributors, licensees, and other independent contractors. Other common arrangements are “strategic
alliances” or joint ventures between two otherwise independent companies where no legal entity is jointly established and owned by the
37
joint venturers. In areas of the law where equity ownership is a necessary criterion, a number of these common contractual relationships
may lie beyond the boundaries of the corporate group. The contractual arrangement will generally itself indicate whether the parties’ arrangement is intended to create joint rights and obligations or otherwise fall within the bounds of the corporate group. For example,
McDonald’s franchisees are not part of the McDonald’s corporate
group even though the franchisee has licensed rights to the McDonald’s tradename, trademarks, and other intellectual property that
constitute its brand and even though the franchisee is the face of the
38
company to the public.
Common ownership more clearly defines where the corporate
group begins, but the question of where the corporate group ends is
another matter. The answer has to do with the second and related
34

See id.
Gunther Teubner, Unitas Multiplex: Corporate Governance in Group Enterprises, in
REGULATING CORPORATE GROUPS IN EUROPE, supra note 24, at 67.
36
SCOTT & DAVIS, supra note 4, at 227; see also John Scott, Corporate Groups and
Network Structure, in CORPORATE CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY: CHANGING
STRUCTURES AND THE DYNAMICS OF REGULATION 291 (Joseph McCahery et al., eds.,
1995) (emphasizing the corporate group as network).
37
See, e.g., MUCHLINSKI, supra note 2, at 62–64, 72–74. In his survey of the law of
corporate groups, Blumberg places contractual relationships beyond the boundaries
of the corporate group. BLUMBERG, supra note 2, at 247.
38
See, e.g., See if You Have What It Takes: McDonald’s Franchising, MCDONALDS,
http://www.aboutmcdonalds.com/mcd/franchising.html (reporting that “[m]ore
than 80%” of McDonald’s franchises are owned and operated by the franchisees)
(last visited Apr. 20, 2012). McDonald’s instead refers to its franchisees as part of the
McDonald’s “system.” Id.
35
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criterion for membership in the corporate group—control. At its
most basic, “control” is defined as the ownership of a majority voting
interest of the corporation’s shares, which confers the power to select
39
the board of directors, although control may also be conferred con40
tractually. Where the shareholder is another corporation, the degree of control exercised by the parent depends primarily on the voting interest of the parent corporation in the subsidiary, which need
not be identical to its financial stake. Subsidiaries may be wholly or
partially owned by their parent company, and the parent corporation
may hold a percentage interest that is also sufficient to exercise indirect control over subsidiaries further down in the corporate struc41
ture. Nonetheless, even where a parent corporation holds, directly
or indirectly, only a minority interest, it may still have the ability to
control the management of the subsidiary corporation through over42
lapping directorates, operational integration, or other means.
Many statutory regimes, including ERISA, follow the eighty percent ownership threshold adopted under the Internal Revenue
Code’s definition of a “controlled corporate group” as a bright line
43
mathematical standard.
Regulatory statutes often sweep broadly,
encompassing the regulated entity and all others “that it controls, is
44
controlled by, or is under common control with.” Because of the
wide variation in control arrangements among firms, however, the
tests developed in common law for establishing the presence of a
45
“control” relationship are generally based on multiple factors. For
example, in cases involving majority shareholder duties, the Delaware
courts define “control” to include majority ownership of the corpora-

39
See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1113–14 (Del.
1994). Share ownership generally carries with it the right to elect the company’s directors and vote on major transactions based on the percentage voting interest held.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 211(b), 212 (2012) (election of directors); id. §
242(b) (charter amendments); id. § 251(c) (mergers); id. § 271(a) (asset sales).
40
See Blumberg, supra note 2, at 304–06, 343–44 (discussing the concept of control underling enterprise liability and noting that control can arise by share ownership and by contract).
41
See, e.g., MUCHLINSKI, supra note 2, at 65–73.
42
See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Kiel, Kevin Hendry & Gavin J. Nicholson, Corporate Governance Options for the Local Subsidiaries of Multinational Enterprises, 14 CORP. GOVERNANCE:
INT’L REV. 568 (2006) (surveying various sources of subsidiary control).
43
Blumberg, supra note 2, at 306 (citing as an example, Employment Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, 26 U.S.C. § 1563(a)(1) (2006), which defines
a “controlled group of corporations” with reference to the eighty percent standard).
44
See Blumberg, supra note 2, at 305 & n.22 (citing examples).
45
See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 12–13 (providing examples of
this variability).
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tion’s voting rights and/or the “actual control” of the business and
46
affairs of the corporation. The latter inquiry is “highly contextual47
ized.” Relevant factors include the appointment by the parent corporation of its own officers to the subsidiary’s board, the presence of
external contracts or other business arrangements that facilitate the
shareholder’s control, and a general alignment of interests among
the corporate entities through which the ultimate parent may exer48
cise control.
Similarly, in veil-piercing jurisprudence, functional
control by a parent corporation over its subsidiary may be found
based on the degree of economic, financial, personnel, and administrative integration within the group, as well as the use of a common
49
public persona. Courts also look to similar factors in interpreting
50
statutory definitions of “control.”
Without control, the corporation’s relationship to an entity
whose shares it owns begins to resemble a pure investment relationship. Yet clear lines cannot always be drawn. For example, which
definition of “control” is relevant? How much indirect control is sufficient for the investee corporation to be deemed part of the corporate group? Should the distinction be based on formal criteria, a
51
more substantive inquiry, or both? At what point is control so attenuated that the corporate shareholder should be considered a passive investor in an unrelated entity rather than a member of the same
corporate group?
A final factor that has guided courts in the veil-piercing context
and in weighing these difficult questions is the consideration of
whether related entities function as a single integrated enterprise.
For example, in the famous case Walkovszky v. Carlton which involved
claims against numerous New York taxi cab companies, the plaintiff
sought to impose liability horizontally on ten separate corporations
operating under common ownership and control on grounds that

46

E.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1113–14 (Del. 1994).
See id.
48
Id. at 1114 (noting that potential to control is insufficient, but finding evidence
of control where a parent corporation with a 43.3% minority share in its subsidiary
had nonetheless exercised actual control over its subsidiary).
49
See BLUMBERG, supra note 2, at 116 (noting that the concept of “control” in veilpiercing cases has not necessarily been limited to a requirement of a majority or controlling ownership interest). For more on veil piercing, see infra Part II.C.1 and
sources cited therein.
50
See, e.g., Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 974 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1992)
(observing that the interpretation of control under the Securities Act depends on the
facts and circumstances of the relationship).
51
Some of these challenges are identified in Sugarman, supra note 24, at 25.
47
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52

they constituted a single economic entity. Although the court in
53
that case rejected plaintiff’s argument, economic and decisional integration remains relevant in determining whether independent entities should be viewed, as a matter of law, as a single integrated enter54
prise. Indeed, many courts often adopt an enterprise approach only
when “control” is accompanied by evidence of financial, operational,
55
or administrative integration.
Ultimately, the bounds of the corporate group must often be set
within particular regulatory domains or by corporations themselves.
Securities regulations and accounting standards give companies some
flexibility in determining whether to include minority holdings with56
in the group for consolidated financial reporting purposes. Corporations can also, by charter or otherwise by contract, determine the
threshold that constitutes “control” in order to delimit the bounds of
57
the corporate group.
Figure 1 illustrates possible definitions of the corporate group,
including contractual relationships. The broadest definition of the
group would reach to the upper left corner of Figure 1 and include
even loose contractual “networks” of intercorporate relationships,
such as global supply chains, in which ownership and control ele58
ments are lacking. Unless defined otherwise, the term “corporate
group” is used in this Article to refer to the narrower conception rep52

223 N.E.2d 6, 7 (N.Y. 1966).
Id. at 10.
54
Labor, employment, and discrimination laws adopt a similar test to determine
whether related entities constitute a single employer. See Blumberg, supra note 2, at
300, 307.
55
Id. at 300–01.
56
See Rule 3A-02(a) of Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.3A-02 (2012)
(“[C]onsolidated statements are [advisable under the regulations] when one entity
directly or indirectly has a controlling financial interest in another entity”). Majorityowned subsidiaries generally must be consolidated. § 210.3A-02(a); Int’l Accounting
Standards Bd., International Financial Reporting Standards, Standard 10, ¶ IN8 at
A373–74 (2011) (effective Jan 1. 2013); id. ¶¶ 17–18, at A377 (“An investor controls
an investee when the investor is exposed, or has rights, to variable returns from its
involvement with the investee and has the ability to affect those returns through its
power over the investee.”).
57
See, e.g., SPRINT NEXTEL CORP., AMENDED AND RESTATED ARTICLES OF
INCORPORATION
Sec.
9
(2005),
available
at
http://www.sprint.com/governance/docs/SprintNextelArticles.pdf (defining control to include the power to vote more than thirty-five percent of an entity’s stock or
to “directly or indirectly . . . elect a majority of the board . . . or direct . . . the management and policies of . . . the entity”).
58
See supra note 36 and sources cited therein (introducing network theories of
the corporation); see also, e.g., MUCHLINSKI, supra note 2 (describing transnational
network enterprises).
53
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resented in the lower right corner of Figure 1—an economic organization or enterprise that is comprised of multiple legal entities linked
by some degree of common ownership and control.
Figure 1: Delimiting the Corporate Group

B. Theories of Corporate Personhood
Since the advent of the corporate form, the extent to which corporations should bear the same rights and duties as individuals has
59
engaged corporate law scholars and the courts. The long-standing
debate surrounding the nature of corporate personhood has focused
60
on three basic perspectives : (i) the concession or “artificial entity”
59
See supra note 1. The corporation is the most developed form of legal entity,
but these perspectives can also be directly applied to other organizations, such as
non-profits or labor unions, which use the corporate form. Some aspects of the discussion that do not depend on limited liability may also apply to partnerships and
other informal associations. See BLUMBERG, supra note 2, at 210–11, 230 (exploring
the extension of enterprise principles to non-corporate business associations); see also
Laski, supra note 1 (exploring theories of entity personhood as applied to associations, including trade unions, trusts, and voluntary organizations); infra Part III.C
(discussing Judge Posner’s analysis of the personhood of a limited liability company
in the Flomo case).
60
There is voluminous literature surrounding these basic theories that cannot be
fully captured in this abbreviated survey. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical
Transformation of the Corporate Form: A Historical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 767, 767 (2005); sources cited supra note 1.
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theory, which sees the corporation as a creation of the state or sover61
eign that grants its charter; (ii) the aggregate theory, which sees the
corporation as a fictional construct representing the sum of its shareholders, managers, and other constituencies who contribute to the
success of the corporate enterprise; and (iii) the real entity view,
which sees the corporation, not as an extension of the state or of its
many constituencies, but as having a separate identity independent of
62
both.
Successive transformations of the corporate form have led to the
63
somewhat cyclical ascendancy of one view over the other. Owing to
the heritage of English corporate law, the corporation has been recognized throughout the history of the United States as a legal person
that enjoys certain rights and obligations independent of its share64
holders. As explored further in Part IV, the contested issues center
instead on which rights and duties must be reserved for natural persons and the rationale for such distinctions. Theories of the corporation speak particularly to these underlying justifications.
The concession theory most accurately reflects the historical origins of the corporation and was the predominant view in the United
65
States until the late nineteenth century. This understanding was
perhaps most famously articulated by Chief Justice Marshall in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward: “A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of
law. . . . Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those prop66
erties which the charter of its creation confers upon it.” Any act of
the corporation beyond the permitted scope contained in its charter
61

This conception is also referred to as the “grant” theory. See, e.g., Ron Harris,
The Transplantation of the Legal Discourse on Corporate Personality Theories: From German
Codification to British Political Pluralism and American Big Business, 63 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1421, 1424 (2006).
62
Some scholars refer to the “real entity” view as the “natural entity theory,”
while others distinguish the two. See, e.g., id.; Michael J. Phillips, Reappraising the Real
Entity Theory of the Corporation, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1061, 1067–68 (1994) (referring
to the two synonymously).
63
See Avi-Yonah, supra note 60 (tracing the evolution of the corporation through
four evolutionary phases); see also Millon, supra note 1, at 205–40. There is some debate over the causal relationship between the emergence of these theories and
changes in corporate law and practice. See, e.g. Millon, supra note 1, at 240–51; Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Relevance of Corporate Theory to Corporate and Economic Development: Comment on the Transplantation of the Legal Discourse on Corporate Personality Theories, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1489 (2006).
64
See Avi-Yonah, supra note 60, at 785–86.
65
Id.; see Millon, supra note 1, at 205–11.
66
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819). The Court in Dartmouth College also drew
on elements of an aggregate theory. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
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was “beyond the power” of the corporation or “ultra vires.” The ultra
vires restriction limited not only the corporation’s scope of opera67
tion, but its economic power and influence in society as well. Because the corporation’s authority was derived from the state, many
early charters were granted to corporations to enable them to advance public purposes rather than strictly profit-making objectives,
68
although commercial ventures also proliferated.
By the late 1800s, New Jersey, and later other states, began to
enact general incorporation statutes that facilitated the growth of for69
profit corporations. In time, the removal of many of the public welfare limits from state corporate codes and the ultimate decline of the
70
ultra vires doctrine rendered the concession view largely obsolete.
A new vision of the corporation that emerged during the early
twentieth century was the aggregate view, which emphasized the ob71
jectives and interests of the individuals who formed the corporation.
This approach was a natural outgrowth of the emphasis on freedom
of contract presumed by the incorporation statutes and was also inspired by massive changes in the economy. The end of the nineteenth century was a time when the growth of large-scale ventures,
such as railroads, steel and oil companies, that required capital from
a broad base of investors was revolutionizing the scale of American
business. The aggregate view therefore resonated with a growing
sense that economic activity was private activity that should be free
from interference by the state, with market forces and private con72
tracting, not state fiat, defining the corporate form.
Like the aggregate view, the “real entity” view developed in response to the decline of state chartering, as corporate activity came to
be seen as private rather than public, and corporate persons came to
be viewed as sharing many of the rights and obligations of natural
67

GREENFIELD, supra note 7, at 77 n.20 (citing Justice Brandeis’ commentary on
the doctrine).
68
See Avi-Yonah, supra note 60, and sources cited therein; see also Millon, supra
note 1, at 210–13.
69
Millon, supra note 1, at 210–13.
70
For more on this history, see, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 63, at 1491–93; see also
Millon, supra note 1, at 212 (tracing the decline of the ultra vires doctrine to the
1920s and perhaps as early as 1898). The ultra vires doctrine is now quite limited in
scope if not actually defunct. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 124 (2011). But see
GREENFIELD, supra note 7, at 73–105 (calling for its revival as a restraint on violations
of law by corporations).
71
See Millon, supra note 1, at 212–15, 220–24. For more on this history, see AviYonah, supra note 60, at 1012 and sources cited therein.
72
See Millon, supra note 1, at 220–24. For more on this history, see Avi-Yonah,
supra note 60, at 1012 and sources cited therein.

HARPER-HO_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

894

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

6/24/2012 12:07 PM

[Vol. 42:879

73

persons. In contrast to the aggregate view, however, the “real entity”
view posits that the corporation’s separate legal personality as a matter of formal structure in fact represents a separate identity that is
more than the sum of the constituencies which contribute to its op74
erations. This view was recognized by the courts in the early 1800s
and came into its own in the early twentieth century when the BerleMeans firm, characterized by a large body of dispersed shareholders
and a concomitant separation of ownership and control, became
75
commonplace across the economy.
Although much early case law and commentary during this period endorsed an aggregate view, with its emphasis on shareholder interests and property rights in the corporation, the new organizational
reality could no longer be squared with the partnership conceptions
76
that had grounded the aggregate view. As a result, the real entity
77
view prevailed during the early decades of the 1900s.
In 1932, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means published their seminal work, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, which reinvigorated the aggregate theory of the corporation and laid the foundation
for conceptions of shareholder primacy that continue to dominate
78
academic and popular understandings of corporate law. They described the transformation of the corporate form in terms of the
agency problems created by the separation of ownership and control,
which, they suggested, could best be resolved by charging managers
79
to serve as trustees for shareholders. As David Millon observes, by
focusing on shareholder property rights, “Berle and Means effectively
disregarded notions of the corporate entity and peered directly into
the corporate enterprise, focusing their attention on . . . the . . .
shareholders and the professional managers” charged with steward-

73

Millon, supra note 1, at 220–24.
See Avi-Yonah, supra note 60, at 1012; Millon, supra note 1, at 213–20.
75
For a thorough discussion of the early caselaw and this history, see Millon, supra note 1, at 205–40; supra note 60. Most scholars trace the real entity view’s roots to
the early 1900s. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 61, at 1472–73.
76
See Horwitz, supra note 1, at 181–82 (discussing the partnership roots of the
corporate form); Millon, supra note 1, at 214 (“[D]evelopments in the internal relationship between management and shareholders rendered the partnership analogy
untenable.”); see also Celia Taylor, The Inadequacy of Fiduciary Duty Doctrine, 85 OR. L.
REV. 993, 1000 (2006).
77
Millon, supra note 1, at 214.
78
ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 312–13 (rev. ed. 1968).
79
Id.; see also Adolf Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049
(1931).
74
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80

ship of their investments. In other words, Berle and Means’ work
rests implicitly on a view of the corporation as “an aggregation composed of shareholders and management, the latter confined to labor
81
for the interests of shareholders.”
Since the rise of the law and economics movement, dominant
thinking about the nature of the corporation has coalesced around
an aggregate theory of the corporation that sees the corporation as a
82
“nexus of contracts.” Under a contractarian approach, the corporation has no separate identity of its own, but is an artificial construct
representing the sum of the various contracts between shareholders,
managers, creditors, and other resource providers, who explicitly or
implicitly negotiate the terms of their participation in the corporate
83
enterprise. Initially, the nexus of contracts approach focused primarily on shareholders’ interests and their role as monitors and en84
forcers of the corporate contract. Later scholars, however, expanded the constituencies whose contracts “mattered” to include
employees, customers, and other stakeholders. A prominent example of the latter view is the team production theory of the firm ad85
vanced by Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout.
The real entity view has fallen out of favor among corporate law
86
scholars as an improper reification of the corporate form. Nonethe-

80

Millon, supra note 1, at 222.
Id. at 222–23. For more on the link between Berle and Means’ work and
shareholder primacy, see id.
82
See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative
Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856,
858–60 (1996) (quoting then-Chancellor Allen’s observation that the contractarian
view is now the “dominant legal academic view” (internal quotations and citation
omitted)). The seminal literature grounding this view include the work of
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 12 (explaining the basis of the “nexus of
contracts” understanding of the firm); Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972) (arguing that information costs explain the rise of firms); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 4
(articulating the nexus of contracts model of the corporation); Frank H. Easterbrook
& Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1418 (1989)
(same).
83
See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 4.
84
See Millon, supra note 1, at 220–24; Phillips, supra note 62, at 1066, 1072–73.
85
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,
85 VA. L. REV. 247, 253 (1999).
86
See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 12 (“The ‘personhood’ of a
corporation is a matter of convenience rather than reality.”); Thomas A. Smith, The
Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty, 98 MICH.
L. REV. 214, 214 (1999) (“To economically oriented corporate law professors, distinguishing between directors’ fiduciary duty to shareholders and a duty to the corpora81
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less, the legacy of the real entity view remains today in modern corporate codes and common law doctrines—most notably the business
judgment rule—that give directors discretion to act independently of
87
the will of the shareholders. Statutory arenas ranging from criminal
88
89
90
law, to securities regulation, to antitrust, as well as certain areas of
91
constitutional law, also reflect the view that the rights and duties of
the corporate entity are distinct from those of the corporation’s officers, directors, and other constituents.
The real entity approach also finds support beyond the legal
academy among scholars of organizational culture and management.
They observe that within single corporate entities as well as within
corporate groups, collective identity emerges from the interrelationships of individuals and coalitions that constitute the organization as a whole. Although these identities may be shaped by senior
management, they cannot be identified with a single individual or
92
leadership structure. The view that a corporation possesses its own
tion itself smacks of reification—treating the fictional corporate entity as if it were a
real thing.”).
87
Ultimate oversight authority rests with the board, which must act in the best
interests of the corporation and its shareholders. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 141(a)
(2011); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000). See generally Stephen Bainbridge,
Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 576
(2003) (identifying sources of director discretion); Virginia Harper Ho, “Enlightened
Shareholder Value”: Corporate Governance Beyond the Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, 36 J.
CORP. L. 59, 73–76 (2010) (surveying the literature on the directory primacy model
of corporate governance).
88
For more on corporate criminal liability, see John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to
Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386 (1981) (arguing that criminal penalties for the corporation should not be displaced by sanctions on individual corporate decision-makers);
V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve? 109 HARV. L. REV.
1477, 1488–91 (1996) (observing that other legal systems outside the AngloAmerican sphere are increasingly receptive to the concept of corporate criminal liability).
89
For more on the consolidation of corporate group affiliates for reporting purposes under the securities laws, see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
90
The Supreme Court has held that parents and their wholly owned subsidiaries
must be treated as one entity under the Sherman Act on grounds that they cannot
“agree” and therefore be deemed to form a “combination” or “conspiracy.”
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 772 (1984).
91
For a discussion on constitutional law, see infra Part III.A. (summarizing these
cases).
92
See, e.g., HOWARD E. ALDRICH, ORGANIZATIONS EVOLVING 2–8 (1999) (defining
organizations as the collective product of individual interactions, that is “socially constructed systems of human activity”) (citations omitted); Suzana B. Rodrigues & John
Child, The Development of Corporate Identity: A Political Perspective, 45 J. MGMT. STUDIES
885 (2008); Said Elbanna & John Child, The Influence of Decision, Environmental and
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“culture” or “identity” was also implicitly accepted by the Delaware
Supreme Court in its landmark case, Paramount Communications v.
Time, Inc., and from a historical standpoint has demonstrated re93
markable staying power.
C. Theories of the Corporate Group and Dimensions of Analysis
In part because the emergence of corporate groups is largely a
twentieth century phenomenon, the theories introduced in Part II.B
above have generally been articulated in terms of a single corporate
entity and the real people behind it. For example, Dartmouth College is
typically cited as the quintessential expression of the concession view,
but it rests simultaneously on the associational interests of the individuals behind it: “By [the corporate form], a perpetual succession of
94
individuals are capable of acting . . . like one immortal being.”
Similarly, early cases adopting an aggregate approach emphasize
the interests of the firm’s individual shareholders, employees, and
managers. One example is the California Circuit Court’s opinion in
the City of Santa Clara v. South Pacific Railroad Co., later affirmed summarily by the Supreme Court, which recognized that corporations are
“persons” within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the
95
Fourteenth Amendment. There, Justice Field stated: “[P]rivate corporations consist of an association of individuals. . . . The courts will
always look through the [corporate] name to see and protect those
96
whom the name represents.” Even though the aggregate theory as
Firm Characteristics on the Rationality of Strategic Decision-Making, 44 J. MGMT. STUDIES
561 (2007); Scott, supra note 36 (analyzing the nature of corporate groups).
93
571 A.2d 1140, 1154–55 (Del. 1990) (permitting Time’s board of directors to
accept a lower offer for its stock given their view that an acquisition by Paramount
would threaten Time’s corporate culture). Unfortunately, the court in Paramount
did not provide any analysis of the implications of that claim for understandings of
the corporation or corporate groups.
94
Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819)
(Story, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
[A]n aggregate corporation at common law is a collection of individuals, united into one collective body, under a special name. . . .
I t possesses the capacity . . . of suing and being sued . . . . [It] is, in
short, an artificial person, existing in contemplation of law, and endowed with certain powers and franchises which, though they must
be exercised through the medium of its natural members, are yet considered as subsisting in the corporation itself, as distinctly as if it were
a real personage.
Id. at 667 (Story, J., concurring).
95
18 F. 385, 402–03 (D. Cal. 1883), aff’d sub nom. Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R.
Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
96
Id.; see Horwitz, supra note 1, at 177–78 (discussing the companion circuit court
cases).
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seen through the lens of modern economics has long recognized that
a corporation’s shareholders, creditors, and other constituents might
themselves be corporations, standard conceptions of the corporation
in the caselaw and in the literature still fail to make any distinction
between their application to single corporations and to complex cor97
porate groups. With the exception of the parent corporation as
shareholder, juridical persons within the corporate group are ignored. The same can be said for articulations of the real entity theo98
ry.
To understand the nature of the corporate group, however, a second dimension is needed. This dimension is best captured by two
competing approaches: the enterprise view and the entity view. An
enterprise approach views all of the legal entities that comprise the
corporate group as part of a single economic organization, while the
entity view emphasizes the separate legal identity of the affiliates that
99
together form the corporate group. Because much of the analysis of
the enterprise-entity distinction has been directed at allocating liability among related entities in a corporate group, this discussion introduces these concepts first in that context before presenting a more
nuanced view of the corporate group that builds on these categories.
1.

Limited Liability & the Corporate Group

Historically, the enterprise and entity views have been articulated as competing theories of liability within tort law and various statutory regimes. In corporate law, they emerge primarily in veil-piercing
100
jurisprudence. Part of the tension between the enterprise and the
entity approach, as well as the courts’ general hesitation to impose
101
enterprise liability, can be explained in part by the complex nature
of the corporate group itself.

97

See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 85, at 275, 278 (describing the Team Production Theory of the corporation as one in which “a number of individuals come together to undertake a team production project that requires all to make some form
of enterprise-specific investment” and noting that “a public corporation is a team of
people”); see also Part III.A. (citing examples from Citizens United v. FEC).
98
See discussion infra notes 184–219 and accompanying text.
99
This distinction was first articulated by Phillip Blumberg. See BLUMBERG, supra
note 2, at 65, 89–90.
100
For a survey of veil-piercing doctrine and practice, see Kurt A. Strasser, Piercing
the Veil in Corporate Groups, 37 CONN. L. REV. 637, 637 n.1 (2005) (listing sources);
Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV.
1036, 1036 (1991); Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Veil Within Corporate Groups: Corporate Shareholders as Mere Investors, 13 CONN. J. INT’L L. 379 (1999).
101
See infra notes 105–09 and accompanying text.
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The fundamental principle that each corporation enjoys a separate legal personality with rights and obligations distinct from those
of its owners, when combined with the grant of limited liability and
the ability of one corporation to own shares in another, makes possi102
ble the formation of corporate groups.
Because each company
within the corporate group is a distinct legal entity, corporations can
structure their subsidiaries and allocate their assets so as to reduce
the parent company’s (and the group’s) exposure to liability as well
as to shield subsidiaries from risk created by other affiliates’ opera103
tions.
Limited liability within the corporate group also reduces
monitoring costs and permits diversification of business operations
across multiple jurisdictions and (in the case of conglomerates, across
multiple industries) to an extent that would be impossible were the
104
corporate form routinely disregarded within the corporate group.
Limited liability is therefore key to the corporate group’s efficiency as
105
an economic organization.
106
Limited liability is also a risk allocation device.
In particular,
limited liability within the corporate group also allows corporations
to shift costs to creditors when compensation cannot be obtained
from the corporate group of which the defaulting entity or tortfeasor
107
is a part. As many commentators have noted, this raises particularly
serious concerns with respect to tort claimants, who cannot contrac108
tually protect themselves against such risks.
102

See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
See MILMAN, supra note 22, at 62–63.
104
See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 40–62 (summarizing the basic rationales for limited liability); see also Stephen Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J.
CORP. L. 479 (2001). To be sure, the benefits of reduced monitoring and other
agency costs are less relevant where there is no separation of ownership and control,
which is the case both for close corporations and for corporate groups with wholly or
majority owned subsidiaries. See David Millon, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Financial Responsibility, and the Limits of Limited Liability, 56 EMORY L.J. 1305, 1314–17 (2007) (observing that efficiency rationales do not apply equally to firms with different ownership structures)
105
See generally, WILLIAMSON, supra note 3 (explaining internal markets within corporate groups).
106
Millon argues in fact that the real policy justifications for limited liability are its
risk-shifting function rather than the standard efficiency rationales. See Millon, supra
note 104, at 1317–25.
107
Limited liability is often contractually waived within the corporate group. See,
e.g., Richard Squire, Strategic Liability in the Corporate Group, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 605
(2011) (describing the role of intragroup guarantees as a type of shareholder opportunism).
108
Some have advocated unlimited liability within corporate groups, at least for
entities within the same industry. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman,
Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1881 n.4
103

HARPER-HO_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

900

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

6/24/2012 12:07 PM

[Vol. 42:879

Imposing obligations, and therefore the potential for liability, on
the corporate group, or on a parent corporation as a proxy for the
group as a whole, however, is problematic because it compels the
courts to disregard the formal legal identity of the individual companies comprising the group. If applied broadly or unpredictably, this
approach would threaten the very existence of corporate groups.
When the separation between the corporation and its shareholders
produces anomalous or inequitable results, courts have elected to
“pierce the corporate veil” vertically or extend enterprise-wide liabil109
ity horizontally, but only in exceptional circumstances.
Beyond veil-piercing doctrine, however, U.S. law has recognized
enterprise principles in a broad range of areas, including judicial
procedure, bankruptcy, and statutes of general and specific applica110
tion to corporate groups. For example, enterprise principles have
been widely adopted for decades under such diverse statutory regimes as environmental law, the Foreign Corrupt Practice Act’s antibribery rules, antitrust, securities regulation, labor and employment
111
laws, and corporate tax law. Some of these regulations have explicit
112
extraterritorial effect.
(1991); Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach to Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1203 (2002). But see Bainbridge, supra note 104. For a
summary of this debate, see Robert J. Rhee, Bonding Limited Liability, 51 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1417, 1417–29 (2010).
109
See Bainbridge, supra note 104, at 506–14 (surveying veil-piercing standards);
see also supra note 100 and sources cited therein.
110
BLUMBERG, supra note 2, at 96–97, 116–20 (summarizing the “unitary tax cases”). For more on recognition of enterprise principles in cross-border insolvencies
and in substantive consolidation doctrine, see Harry Rajak, Corporate Groups and CrossBorder Bankruptcy, 44 TEX. INT’L L.J. 521 (2009); William H. Widen, Corporate Form and
Substantive Consolidation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 237 (2007).
111
See Blumberg, supra note 2, at 307–26. Blumberg divides statutory regimes into
those of (i) “general application,” such as antitrust and trade regulation, labor, environmental, and intellectual property laws, that do not explicitly reference corporate
groups, and (ii) statutes of “specific application” to corporate groups, like the Bank,
Savings and Loan, and Public Utility Holding Company Acts, which are designed
specifically to regulate corporate groups on an enterprise-wide basis. BLUMBERG, supra note 2, at 101. In the environmental arena, the Supreme Court has retreated
from the enterprise theories of liability observed by Blumberg. See, e.g., United States
v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 67–70 (1998) (holding that a parent corporation could not
be liable for violations of CERCLA by its subsidiary solely by virtue of its ownership
interest and majority control of the subsidiary board).
112
See, e.g., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006);
Arms Export Control Act of 1976, 22 U.S.C. § 2278 (2006) (munitions export controls); Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. §§ 730–774 (2012); see also Jeffrey A. Meyer, Dual Illegality and Geoambiguous Law: A New Rule for Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law, 95 MINN. L. REV. 110 (2010) (surveying the doctrine governing
extraterritorial application of U.S. law). Some statutory regimes previously under-
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Under common law, then, enterprise liability is acknowledged
only in exceptional cases, while its application within statutory regimes has expanded over time. Despite the acceptance of enterprise
principles in many areas of the law, Professor Blumberg—whose writings form the foundation of legal scholarship on corporate groups—
concludes, based on a comprehensive survey across different areas of
the law, that “enterprise law is not transcendental. It is applied only
in selected areas of the law where it more effectively implements the
underlying purposes and objectives of the law. In other respects, en113
tity law continues unaffected.”
2.

Extending Theories of Corporate Personhood to the
Corporate Group

Because limited liability is essential to the existence of corporate
groups, this Article does not argue for its elimination. Although others have made a convincing case for this within the bounds of the
114
corporate group, the remainder of this Article assumes no alteration in the scope of current limited liability rules. Instead, this Article
considers how analyses of corporate identity might be applied to the
corporate group.
As a starting point, consider first how the three traditional approaches to corporate identity intersect with the enterprise-entity distinction. Figure 2 illustrates how the conceptions of corporate identity that have been introduced here with respect to single firms (the
entity approach) can be easily extended to corporate groups (the enterprise approach) simply by shifting the level of analysis.

stood to have extraterritorial effect have been limited by the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). See, e.g.,
United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 2d 23 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding
that the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) does not
apply extraterritorially post-Morrison).
113
BLUMBERG, supra note 2, at 230.
114
See discussion supra note 108.
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Figure 2: Theories of Corporate Personhood in Two Dimensions

Entity
(single corporation)

Enterprise
(corporate group)

Concession
Theory

Corporations
chartered by the state or
sovereign.

Corporate groups chartered
by a national or transnational chartering authority.

Aggregate
Theory

The corporation is a fictional
construct
representing the sum of its
constituencies.

The corporate group is a
fictional construct representing the sum of its affiliates
and their constituencies.

Real Entity
Theory

The corporation has a separate identity
greater than the sum of its
constituencies.

The corporate group has a
separate identity greater
than the sum of its affiliates
and their constituencies.

i.

A Concession Theory of the Corporate Group

During the period when corporations were created by grant of
the state, chartering authorities did not authorize corporations to include in their approved purposes holding shares of other corpora115
tions.
The formation of the corporate group became possible in
the United States only in 1888 when New Jersey first permitted one
116
corporation to become a shareholder of another. Accordingly, the
corporate group was not initially associated with the concession or
grant model, even though states continued to charter corporations
117
well into the early 1900s.
Were the concession theory of the corporate group (shown in
the upper right of Figure 2) to be revived for the modern corporate
group, the corporate group would itself need to be created by grant
118
from the state.
Since today’s corporate groups extend beyond national boundaries, this approach would have practical meaning for
many companies only in the unlikely event that a transnational legal
115

See BLUMBERG, supra note 2, at 52–58.
Act of Apr. 4, 1888, ch. 269, 1 1888 N.J. Laws 385.
117
See Taylor, supra note 76, at 998–1001.
118
Here, the term “state” refers to the source of chartering authority in a given
jurisdiction, which could be at the supranational, national, or sub-national level.
State-owned enterprises in Europe and in Asia are perhaps the closest modern example of corporate groups that operate under a quasi-concession model, although in
the standard concession theory, the state holds no ownership stake.
116

HARPER-HO_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

6/24/2012 12:07 PM

THEORIES OF CORPORATE GROUPS

903

order emerges with the authority to charter transnational corporations. The company law harmonization project of the European Union, the introduction of the European company as a separate entity
form, and the creation of pan-European Works Councils suggest a
model for such an approach, and scholars have begun to consider the
119
potential for similar developments to emerge globally.
However,
because this Article is focused on the import of these theories for
U.S. law, the remainder of this discussion will consider only the “aggregate enterprise” and “real enterprise” theories.
ii.

An Aggregate Enterprise Theory of the Corporate
Group

If at the level of the corporation, the aggregate approach emphasizes the interests of the shareholders or other constituencies that
form the corporation, then an “aggregate enterprise” approach to
the corporate group must focus its analysis on the discrete business
entities that constitute it and might reject any separate identity for
the corporate group itself. Oliver Williamson’s work provides a theoretical grounding for an application of aggregate theories to the corporate group. Williamson and others extended transaction cost theories of the firm to explain the corporate group as a larger system of
explicit and implicit contracts among the members of the corporate
group who provide resources within the corporate enterprise as a
120
whole.
As German legal scholar and sociologist Gunther Teubner
notes, “This approach allows the organized firm to be seen within a
spectrum of various types of contractual relationships, from the spotmarket transaction up to the multinational group,” each with varying
121
governance structures.”
In other words, because both a single corporation, such as WalMart Stores, Inc., and the entire corporate group popularly known as
“Wal-Mart” are firms, they can both be viewed as a fictional nexus of
119

See MILMAN, supra note 22, at 15–20 (surveying various harmonization efforts in
Europe, Africa, and via the model law projects of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)); see also Larry Cata Backer, From Moral Obligation to International Law: Disclosure Systems, Markets and the Regulation of Multinational
Corporations, 39 GEO. J. INT’L L. 591 (2008) (proposing international law as a source
of regulation for global corporate groups); Robin F. Hansen, The International Legal
Personality of Multinational Enterprises: Treaty, Custom and the Governance Gap, 10 GLOB.
JURIST 1 (2010) (advances same). At present, territorial sovereignty prevents any
state from authorizing or chartering an entity outside its borders.
120
See WILLIAMSON, supra note 3; see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at
12–13 (describing the range of organizational forms adopted by corporate groups to
illustrate the contractual nature of the corporate form).
121
See Teubner, supra note 35, at 70.
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the contracts that create them. More specifically, an “aggregate enterprise” theory of the corporate group conceives of an entire economic enterprise, such as “Wal-Mart,” not simply as Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., the parent company of the Wal-Mart group, but as the complex
aggregation of the relationships among the legal entities that comprise the Wal-Mart corporate group globally.
Under this vision, the relevant contracts are those between the
corporate group and its shareholders, though precisely which shareholders’ interests should matter is unclear: Is it the parent’s interests? The affiliates’ interests? The minority shareholders’ interests?
A broader alternative view is possible. Under the latter, the relevant
contracts might include contracts among the entities that comprise
the group and all affiliates’ contracts with their respective constituencies—a potentially unlimited set.
Regardless of how this choice is made, the aggregate enterprise
view, as a practical matter, implies two potential sets of legal rules.
The first is the functional equivalent of a first-dimension entity approach. Under this “pure aggregate” approach, the group itself
would be completely disregarded, and legal rules would only apply to
the individual firms that make up the corporate group. Because this
approach silos each entity within the corporate group, it would effectively ignore the network of relationships between and among corporate group affiliates that define the group’s internal organizational
and management structure and ultimately the corporate group itself.
The only exception might be perhaps, direct parent-subsidiary relationships, which should be taken into account because the immediate
parent corporation is a shareholder whose interests define the interests of its subsidiary. There is, however, little practical benefit to such
an approach, since it implies no change to simple entity-based rules.
The pure aggregate approach is also unworkable in practice because in deciding cases involving entities with common ownership
and control, courts cannot completely disregard the relationships between corporate affiliates and the existence of the larger corporate
group. Instead, they are called upon to interpret the explicit and
implicit contracts within the group and between members of the
group and third parties. For example, the common law of fiduciary
duties for majority shareholders has developed in recognition of the
potential conflicts of interest that arise because of the control parent
corporations exercise over their subsidiaries. Yet such conflicts do
not exist if the reality of the group itself is not acknowledged. Similarly, agency problems within the corporate group cannot be under-
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stood without consideration of the existence of the group as an or122
ganization.
Therefore, just as the corporation as a fictional nexus of contracts is reconciled with an understanding that corporations are juridical entities with rights and duties independent of their shareholders,
so an aggregate enterprise theory must mean that the corporate
group is a fictional aggregate wherein legal rules may apply to the
corporate group on an enterprise-wide basis even though the group
itself has no independent identity. For example, it may be more efficient within securities or tax law to regulate related entities collectively by means of this fictional construct on a consolidated or enterprise
basis even if there is no actual reality or legal entity that may be identified as the corporate group.
This is in fact the standard
contractarian approach to the corporate group as a firm and the only
coherent way in which enterprise principles might properly be ex123
tended to it consistent with an aggregate theory.
It is also the
meaning intended by references to the “aggregate enterprise” approach in the remainder of this Article.
There are, however, a number of limitations to an aggregate vision of the corporate group, particularly when applied to modern
124
corporate groups that function on a globally integrated basis. First,
since U.S. law does not recognize the corporate group as an independent legal entity, the practical application of this approach requires a designated entity within the corporate group, such as its ultimate parent or headquarters, to represent the consolidated group
125
for purposes of regulatory compliance.
This system of unitary attribution is at odds with the decentralized and multi-centric decision126
making structures now common among many corporate groups.
122

See, e.g., Bongjin Kim, John E. Prescott, & Sung Min Kim, Differentiated Governance of Foreign Subsidiaries in Transnational Corporations: An Agency Theory Perspective, 11
J. INT’L MGMT. 43 (2005) (discussing strategies used to address these internal conflicts).
123
See WILLIAMSON, supra note 3 (applying relational contracting theory to explain
the emergence of modern corporate groups).
124
See generally, Samuel J. Palmisano, The Globally Integrated Enterprise, 85 FOREIGN
AFF. 127 (2006) (describing the shift from the “multinational corporation” to the
“globally integrated enterprise”).
125
For purposes of the securities laws, for example, the “representative” of the
consolidated entity will be the registrant or issuer, and for tax purposes, the entity is
the U.S. “citizen” or taxpayer. These need not be synonymous with the ultimate parent or headquarters of a global corporate group.
126
See, e.g., Julian M. Birkenshaw & Allen J. Morrison, Configurations of Strategy &
Structure in Subsidiaries of Multinational Corporations, 26 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 729 (1995)
(analyzing “hierarchical” and “heterarchical” governance models); Yves Doz & C.K.
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More fundamentally, notions of freedom of contract on which
an aggregate enterprise view must be premised disregard the ability
of the corporate group’s parent or controlling affiliate to unilaterally
expand or contract the group (e.g., by forming or dissolving existing
127
entities) to accomplish the group’s strategic goals.
In addition, as
Teubner notes,
The dissolution of economic organizations into a complex contractual nexus [of affiliates] makes sense only with respect to
member recruitment and the utilization of individual motivation
for the purposes of the organization. But as soon as the contractual mechanism becomes [reduced to exchange relationships
among resource holders]. . . . Cooperative and collective aspects
128
of the organization are systematically ignored.

iii. A Real Enterprise Theory of the Corporate Group
An alternative approach is to view the corporate group as a “real
enterprise.” As with other theories of the corporation, references in
case law and academic articles to the rights or obligations of the corporation or to the real entity view of the corporation tend to do so
without explaining how the concepts of identity associated with the
corporation as a legal entity might apply, if at all, to the corporate
129
group. Extending the real entity view to the corporate group necessarily implies that the group itself has an identity independent from
that of its constituent firms. This collective identity must also be distinct from that of the individual directors, officers, employees, and
Prahalad, Patterns of Strategic Control Within Multinational Corporations, 15 J. BUS. STUD.
55 (1984) (analyzing the managerial challenge of balancing responsiveness of subsidiaries to local conditions and the need for global strategic integration); Morten Huse
& Violina P. Rindova, Stakeholders’ Expectations of Board Roles: The Case of Subsidiary
Boards, 5 J. MGMT. & GOVERNANCE 153, 157–58, 171 (2001) (surveying the literature
on subsidiary board function); Palmisano, supra note 124, at 134. But see Geoffrey C.
Kiel, Kevin Hendry & Gavin J. Nicholson, Corporate Governance Options for the Local
Subsidiaries of Multinational Enterprises, 14 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L REV. 568 (2006)
(noting the perfunctory role of many multinational subsidiary boards).
127
See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 14; see also id. and sources cited therein (surveying the literature on the relationship between multinational management strategy and corporate group structure).
128
Teubner, supra note 35 at 71. Teubner identifies several limits of contractually
based theories of the group, including the following: i) its emphasis on competition
among “resource holders” within the group ignores cooperative aspects that create
efficiency advantages, ii) the organization’s members are subject to organizational
norms and further its goals, iii) the contractual network is formed organically
through evolutionary rather than market mechanisms, iv) transactions within the organization are decisions, not economic exchanges, and v) “the corporate interest is
“an independent criterion in resolving conflicts among resource holders.” Id. at 73.
129
See, e.g., disucssion infra Part III.
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other agents through whom the parent, headquarters, or any other
entity comprising the corporate group may act. From this perspective, for example, “Wal-Mart” is an ontological construct more akin to
the embodiment of the Wal-Mart brand than an extension of the
Walton family, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., or its CEO. In contrast to the
aggregate enterprise view, a real enterprise approach acknowledges
the possibility for the corporate group itself to bear independent
rights and duties apart from those of its constituent firms. This concept is recognized to a limited extent in cases extending enterprise
130
liability horizontally across a corporate group.
The real enterprise approach more closely meshes as a descriptive matter with the economic realities of corporate groups. Many
multinational enterprises, in particular, utilize internal financing,
management, and resource allocation mechanisms that extend across
131
and integrate the entire enterprise. This view also offers the best fit
with research on organizational and corporate identity finding the
dynamic interactions among senior managers and even key employees across separate divisions and affiliates within a corporate group
can together produce an independent corporate identity or cul132
ture.
However, like the aggregate enterprise approach, adopting a
unitary view of the corporate group in practical terms requires the
rights and duties of the corporate group to attach to the parent corporation or to another member of the corporate family. This approach presumes a hierarchical or pyramidal organizational structure
and fits poorly with integrated, decentralized, collective, or multidimensional decision-making structures that are found within many
133
corporate groups. Secondly, as Janet Dine has observed, legal rules
based on a strict unitary view of the corporate group ignore or even
“destroy[] the separate identities of the companies within the group,”
which are formed often for regulatory and tax planning reasons and
134
so “may remove real business convenience.”
An alternative version of the real enterprise theory offers a potential solution to this dilemma. Building on network theory, Gun-

130

See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 104 (discussing such cases in contrast to vertical
veil-piercing).
131
Multinational corporate groups are discussed further infra Part III.
132
See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text.
133
See, e.g., Sugarman, supra note 24, at 20; see also supra note 124 and sources cited therein.
134
DINE, supra note 2, at 62–63; Teubner, supra note 35 at 88−89 (criticizing a unitary view as deemphasizing intra-group dynamics).
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ther Teubner and John Scott have proposed a vision of the corporate
group as a “polycorporate network” characterized by multiple interre135
lated decision centers rather than by hierarchy. Indeed, commentators observe trends toward such a “heterarchical” structure among
multinational firms, where geographical, product-based, or function136
al centers are spread across the organization. Empirical studies also
show that the organizational structure of many corporate groups does
not necessarily follow a traditional hierarchy under a single decision
137
center and controlling parent company. Consistent with a real enterprise perspective, the group or “network” itself has an identity independent from either the parent or any of the other members of
138
the corporate group.
Rights, duties, and legal liability can therefore potentially be borne by the network itself independent of the responsibilities borne by the members of the corporate group. Even if
the corporate group is not formerly granted legal person status,
recognition of multiple or cooperative control structures implies that
legal responsibility for the network could be imputed to some or all
139
group members, not just to the group’s headquarters or parent.
The primary limitation of this approach is the challenge of
providing predictability, notice, and legal certainty in the absence of
an identifiable “seat” of legal obligation for the corporate group,
clear standards for assigning liability among group affiliates, or even a
uniform default definition for the corporate group itself. These issues are considered further in Part IV.
D. Intersections of Entity and Enterprise Theories
Part C has extended theories of the corporation to develop alternative theories of corporate groups. Of these approaches, the “aggregate enterprise” approach best fits the formal legal structure of
the corporate group as an extended “nexus of contracts.” However,
at a descriptive level, the “real enterprise” view better suits the realities of the corporate group as a corporate network. If the corporate
group is viewed, at least for some purposes, wholistically from an enterprise perspective, a final issue to consider is how the real entity

135

See Teubner, supra note 35 at 69−70. See generally Scott, supra note 36.
PETER MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 47–50 (2d ed.
2007).
137
See, e.g., Birkenshaw & Morrison, supra note 126 and sources cited therein; Doz
& C Prahalad, supra note 126 and sources cited therein.
138
See generally Scott, supra note 36.
139
See Teubner, supra note 35 at 91−92 (proposing alternative policies to operationalize a “polycorporate network” approach).
136
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and aggregate entity views at the level of the individual corporation
intersect with the real enterprise and aggregate enterprise views at
the level of the group.
In other words, is a “real enterprise” approach to corporate
groups compatible with a “nexus of contracts” view of the corporation
itself? Or can these theories be internally consistent only if the same
theoretical approach to the entity is applied at the level of the corporate group? To the extent that both the corporate group and an individual corporation can be theorized as a single economic organization or “firm,” one would expect the entity and enterprise dimensions
of this analysis to necessarily move in tandem. However, it turns out
that this is not entirely so. The analytical set is described in Figure 3
below. The concession theory is omitted here, given its lesser practical relevance.
Figure 3: Intersections of Entity and Enterprise Theories Within
Corporate Groups
Enterprise Theory (corporate group)
Real
Entity
Entity
Theory*
(single
corporate
entity)

Aggregate
Entity

Real Enterprise
Corporate group: separate
group identity

Aggregate Enterprise
Corporate group: no separate
group identity apart from that
of its constituent entities

Entity within the group: separate identity independent of its
management, shareholders,
affiliates, and other constituencies
Real Enterprise
Corporate group: separate
group identity

Entity within the group: separate identity independent of its
management, shareholders,
affiliates, and other constituencies
Aggregate Enterprise
Corporate group: no separate
group identity apart from that
of its constituent entities

Entity within the group: no
separate identity; entity as
“nexus of contracts” among its
management, shareholders,
affiliates, and other constituencies

Entity within the group: no
separate group identity; entity
as “nexus of contracts” among
its management, shareholders,
affiliates, and other constituencies

*Here, the “entity” dimension refers to the nature of each individual corporation or other entity that makes up the corporate group collectively.

In Figure 3, the upper left and lower right sectors pose little difficulty, with a similar understanding of the corporation at the entity
level being extended to the corporate group. For example, in the
upper left sector, the corporate group has its own collective identity,
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which is distinct from that of the other “real entities” that make up its
corporate family. An example of a legal rule that reflects this perspective is the corporate attorney-client privilege under federal common law. As articulated by the Supreme Court in Upjohn Co. v. United
States, the privilege attaches to the corporation itself, not to its direc140
tors, officers, or other key decision-makers. Thus, this standard re141
flects a real entity view of the corporation.
Reasoning “that the
parent (as well as the subsidiary) is the “client” for purposes of the attorney client privilege, federal courts and a number of state courts
have held that the privilege is not held by a particular entity within
142
the corporate structure but extends across the corporate group.
This rationale reflects a real enterprise approach to the corporate
group as well.
The lower right sector, the “aggregate-aggregate” section, represents the corporate group enterprise as a nexus of contracts. Here,
the corporate group is no more than the sum of its parts, an extended web of implicit and explicit contracts, including the contracts between parent companies as shareholders and their subsidiaries within
the corporate structure. Similarly, each of the constituent legal enti-

140
449 U.S. 383 (1981) (holding that the attorney-client privilege extends to “the
corporation” not solely to the “control group” of senior managers”); see also Bell v.
Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 263 (1964) (acknowledging that a “corporation, like any
other ‘client,’ is entitled to the attorney-client privilege” (citation omitted)). This is
consistent with the ethical obligations of attorneys to the corporation under the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Under Model Rule 1.13, “A lawyer employed
or retained by an organization represents the organization and not its directors, officers, or other constituents.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2011).
141
While this rule is most consistent with a real entity approach, it can be understood from an aggregate entity perspective as well. Under the latter view, the corporation as a legal entity is a fictional construct that possesses independent rights and duties. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
142
See, e.g., In re Teleglobe Commc’ns. Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 369−70 (3d Cir. 2007)
(surveying relevant precedent on this issue). Notably, Upjohn itself involved an investigation of potential anti-bribery violations by the company’s foreign subsidiaries and
therefore concerned communications between the attorney and employees across
the corporate structure. But see Glidden Co. v. Jandernoa, 173 F.R.D. 459, 472−73
(W.D. Mich. 1997) (viewing the constituent companies within the group as “joint clients”). Some courts have also viewed affiliated corporate entities as a single client
based on their “community of interest.” See, e.g., id. (“The universal rule of law, expressed in a variety of contexts, is that the parent and subsidiary share a community
of interest . . . .”); United States v. AT&T Co., 86 F.R.D. 603, 616 (D.D.C. 1980) (“The
cases clearly hold that a corporate ‘client’ includes not only the corporation by
whom the attorney is . . . retained, but also parent, subsidiary and affiliate corporations. . . . If the claimant of the privilege can show a substantial identity of legal interest in the
specific matter, it therefore makes no difference whether the two corporations were so affiliated as
to be a single ‘client.’”.) (emphasis added). But see In re Teleglobe, 493 F.3d at 366 (criticizing this approach).
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ties is itself an aggregation of the contracts reached among its shareholders, creditors, managers, employees, customers, and other constituencies. Both the group and its member entities are purely fictional constructs.
In the upper right sector, the separate legal identity of the corporation is understood to reflect its real personhood but the corporate group is not—the group is simply an aggregation of affiliates that
are linked by shareholding contracts. Under this view, there is little
to distinguish equity-based corporate groups from other contractual
relationships, such as the cartel or the joint venture. As a practical
matter, this view implies that basic entity-based principles should
generally apply because the proper bearer of legal rights and duties
and the source of any collective “mind” or “will” is at the entity rather
than the enterprise level. For example, some states that adopt the
federal Upjohn test—again, one that the Supreme Court grounded on
a real entity view—adopt an aggregate enterprise view at the group
level, seeing the two affiliates as “joint clients” rather than a single
143
“polycorporate” client.
The lower left box is the only sector that represents an internal
inconsistency between the two dimensions—it indicates a concept of
the corporate group as having a “transcendent” identity while viewing
each constituent entity within the group as a mere “nexus of contracts.” Yet, some common legal rules in fact fit this pattern. For example, the appellate court’s decision—reversed in Upjohn—adopted a
“control group” rule of corporate attorney-client privilege that is expressly premised on the aggregate entity view and remains the rule in
144
a number of states.
Distinguishing natural and juridical persons,
the appellate court concluded that since the client was an inanimate
entity, “only the senior management, guiding and integrating the
143
In re Teleglobe, 493 F.3d at 369−70; Glidden Co., 173 F.R.D. at 472−73 (“Numerous courts have recognized that, for purposes of the attorney client privilege, the
subsidiary and the parent are joint clients.”). For example, New York adopts an aggregate approach not based on group identity. It requires a “common legal interest”
to bring two entities, even affiliates in a corporate group, under the “joint client
rule.” See, e.g., Bowne of N.Y. City, Inc. v. AmBase Corp, 150 F.R.D. 465, 491
(S.D.N.Y. 1993).
144
United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1226–27 (6th. Cir. 1979), rev’d, 449
U.S. 383 (1981). The control group test has been adopted in Alaska, Hawaii, Illinois,
Maine, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Oregon, and South Dakota. See Brian E. Hamilton, Conflict, Disparity, and Indecision: The Unsettled Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege,
1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 629 (surveying state adoption or rejection of Upjohn); see also
Caremark, Inc. v. Affiliated Computer Servs., Inc., 192 F.R.D. 263 (N.D. Ill. 2000)
(applying the Illinois “control group” test of Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co.,
432 N.E.2d 250 (Ill. 1982)); HAW. R. EVID. 503 & cmts; OR. EVID. CODE 503(1)(d) &
cmts.
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several operations . . . can be said to possess an identity analogous to
145
the corporation as a whole.” Although there are no cases so hold146
ing as of the time of this writing, an example of this mixed approach would arise if a state that retains the control group test were
to apply it across corporate families on an enterprise or group basis.
This matrix suggests that there is considerable flexibility in the
way that understandings of the corporate group and the corporation
intersect, and therefore, in how legal rules that apply at the entity
level might be applied to the corporate group as a whole. It also emphasizes the importance of considering, at both the entity and the
enterprise level, which perspective is most likely to advance the policy
goals of a given area of the law. Where laws or regulations are intended to apply broadly to all corporations—whether single entities
or part of a larger group—the intersection of these two levels should
be considered.
E. The Normative Implications of Corporate Theory
This Article has thus far introduced current theories of the corporation and extended them explicitly to corporate groups. The underlying assumption behind this effort, of course, is that questions of
corporate identity matter to the development of legal rules. Yet, this
assumption has been challenged. After surveying the evolution of the
theories of corporate personhood, a number of scholars have argued
that it is all so much ado about nothing and that theories in fact
simply do not matter, either from a normative or positive stand147
point. This is a serious contention that merits a response.
Beginning first from a positivist critique, they observe that attempts to map the three theories and their variations systematically
against the evolution of legal principles historically have been unsuc148
cessful as either a descriptive or predictive matter.
One reason is

145
Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 390 (quoting Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d at 1226) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
146
For states adopting the control group test, see supra note 144. As of Oct. 27,
2011, no court had decided whether to adopt a “joint client” (i.e., aggregate) or
“community of interest” (i.e., enterprise) approach at the group level.
147
See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 63; Phillips, supra note 1 (reviewing, inter alia,
Dewey’s consequentialist and indeterminacy arguments); see also Dewey, supra note 1,
at 669, 673 (pointing to the reemergence of each view over time as evidence of the
“irrelevance” of theory).
148
See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 63, at 1494 (arguing that the evolution of various
corporate law principles “could easily have been varied by positive law under any of
the different theories” and that “[w]hat mattered was the practicalities” driving different doctrinal areas).
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that, as David Millon has observed, the link “between corporate theory and doctrinal and social developments is, in fact, more complex”
149
than a unidirectional causal relationship. He notes that “[w]e have
yet to develop an adequate account of corporate theory’s [legitimating] function,” that is, its role in bolstering emerging regulatory or
150
policy developments. Another reason is that the complexity, diversity, and ongoing evolution of organizational forms makes tracing
these theories’ influence empirically difficult. One of the best syntheses of the historical evidence is perhaps Millon’s own conclusion
that the relationship between corporate theory and social practice is
151
best understood as interdependent and mutually legitimating.
While corporate theory may not itself suffice to legitimate new legal
forms or rules, neither is it irrelevant to their evolution.
A second challenge is that both academic commentary and the
courts have yet to distill a single, elegant theoretical understanding
that captures the corporation’s complex and multifaceted identity
(though network theory and the conventional contractarian view
both come close). Critics also note that while each position’s advocates claim normative superiority, the actual implications of the theo152
ries are more muddled.
Understandings of the corporate group
are evolving even more slowly. This argument, in essence, is that
corporate theory is indeterminate, lacking any definitive meaning or
153
normative impact.
Given that the corporate form is used by a wide range of firms—
from close corporations to the global conglomerate—achieving a single unifying view of corporate identity may well be an impossible or
even undesirable goal. Indeed, the different pragmatic and policy
concerns underlying different areas of the law necessitate grounding
in alternative visions of corporate (or group) identity. As a result,
competing corporate theories can coexist across different doctrinal
arenas, as explored later in this Article.

149

See Millon, supra note 1, at 241
See id. (responding to arguments by Horwitz, supra note 1).
151
See id. at 243.
152
See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 1 (arguing that corporate theory is of little relevance to corporate social responsibility and that each of the theories of corporate
personhood have been used to support divergent and even competing normative
claims). But see Susanna K. Ripken, Corporations Are People Too: A Multi-Dimensional
Approach to the Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97 (2009)
(drawing on multiple theories to advance a conception of the corporation as having
a moral, economic, and even “spiritual” dimensions).
153
For the competing positions on the “determinacy” of corporate theory, see
Horwitz, supra note 1, at 175–76; Millon, supra note 1, at 243–51.
150
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Moreover, as Part III demonstrates, within particular cases—even
cases touching, for example, on fundamental constitutional rights—
assessments of corporate rights and duties cannot be severed from
the courts’ fundamental understandings of what, in fact, the corporation, and by extension, the corporate group, actually is. Indeed, the
broad influence of the nexus of contracts vision of the corporation
on corporate law itself demonstrates the impact of theory on the evolution of legal rules. In a given social and economic context, then,
theories of the corporation can have determinate legal or political
154
significance.
If perceptions of corporate identity in fact matter to
case outcomes, then it is important to consider the potential normative implications of the competing theories and how these normative
claims might apply to the corporate group.
1.

The Concession Theory

Normative conclusions are easiest to draw under a concession
theory of the corporation. Created by the state, corporations were
accountable to the sovereign, or in the case of the United States, ultimately to the electorate, to carry out the largely public purposes for
155
which they were formed.
In addition, states used the corporate
charter to impose limits on corporate (mis)conduct and on the economic power of the corporation, which gave them direct power over
156
the corporation to advance the public welfare. Because of the concession theory’s emphasis on the obligations of the corporation and
its skeptical view of corporate power, some scholars have argued that
modern corporate law should revive this lost understanding of the
corporation as a force for producing both social and economic
157
wealth and reintroducing a sense of public duty to the corporation.
2.

Aggregate Theories

An aggregate theory of the corporation, in contrast, is grounded
on the freedom of contract of the contributors to the corporate enterprise. Accordingly, this theory is associated with the notion that
the purpose of the corporation is inherently private rather than pub154
Horwitz, supra note 1, at 175–76; cf. Millon, supra note 1, at 241–51 (contending that normative implications of the theories can only be observed specifically in
hindsight and are otherwise continually evolving).
155
See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 949–50 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The Framers . . . took it as a given that corporations could be comprehensively regulated in the service of the public welfare.”).
156
Id.; see also Mitchell, supra note 63, at 1491–92 (noting that early general incorporation statutes initially maintained many of these limits).
157
See, e.g., GREENFIELD, supra note 7.
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158

lic.
Therefore, any responsibility of the corporation must derive
from the expectations of the corporation’s constituencies and, particularly, their contract with the shareholders as residual claimants to
159
the firm’s assets.
If shareholder wealth maximization is the contracted-for objective of the corporation, the normative standard by
which corporate conduct should be judged is in fact economic rather
than moral, making economic efficiency the surest path to maximiz160
ing shareholder and firm wealth, and ultimately, societal wealth.
Some have broadened the normative implications of aggregate
approaches by arguing that the terms of the corporate contract inure
161
to the benefit of a wider range of constituencies.
For example,
Blair and Stout’s Team Production Theory of the firm posits that the
firm has contractually obligated itself to a broad range of contributors to the corporate enterprise, including employees and even credi162
tors. Their theory is not only consistent with the standard “nexus of
contracts” vision of the corporation but also with a contractually
163
grounded notion of corporate social responsibility.
The fact that aggregate theories can support such divergent
views has led some to argue that the theory’s normative implications
164
are ambiguous. Nonetheless, even such critics admit that the nexus
of contracts (i.e., aggregate) view of the corporation commonly is regarded as having at least one solid moral implication,” that is, that “it
165
makes specifically corporate moral responsibility impossible.”
Because the corporation has no “real” identity, any moral responsibility
must rest with its individual directors, officers, or shareholders of the
corporation, if at all. Similarly, at the level of the corporate group,
moral obligation can be attributed solely to the individual directors
and officers who serve on behalf of a specific corporate entity within
the group. Since the corporate group has no separate legal identity
under U.S. law, any legal obligations that apply at the enterprise level,
for example under federal securities laws, must therefore be justified
solely on efficiency grounds.
158

See Millon, supra note 1, at 220−40.
See generally Jill Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder
Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637 (2006) (reviewing the foundations of shareholder primacy).
160
For a classic articulation of the traditional approach, see EASTERBROOK &
FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 35−39.
161
See supra notes 84−85 and sources cited therein.
162
See Blair & Stout, supra note 85, at 250.
163
Id. at 253−54.
164
See Millon, supra note 1, at 241−51; Phillips, supra note 1, at 242.
165
Phillips, supra note 1, at 242.
159
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Whether an aggregate enterprise perspective is compatible with
corporate social responsibility or stakeholder accountability as a
normative objective depends on how the nature of the group contract is understood. If controlling shareholder interests are paramount, then the normative objective of the corporate group is to
maximize their wealth. Thus, for example, in Delaware, the directors
of wholly owned subsidiaries are obligated to manage the subsidiary
166
in the interests of the parent and its shareholders. However, shareholder economic interests are more likely to be diffuse in any organizational structure with minority shareholders at some level within the
group. It is even more difficult to extend a stakeholder-oriented aggregate approach to the corporate group. Such an approach requires the “nexus of contracts” to include all of the constituencies
(i.e., employees, creditors, and local communities) associated with
every member of the corporate group—a potentially unlimited set.
Moreover, it is unclear how the mediating function of subsidiary
boards would be reconciled with their (varying) fiduciary duties
167
across multiple jurisdictions.
In sum, the aggregate theory emphasizes the economic interests
of the firm’s constituents and, particularly, its shareholders’ interests
over moral or ethical obligations. For corporate groups, it implies
that the legal rules directed at the corporate group should be those
that improve the economic efficiency of the group. This objective
may be different for some corporate groups than maximizing shareholder wealth at the parent level or advancing stakeholder or minority shareholder interests at the subsidiary level.
3.

Real Entity & Enterprise Theories

In his account of the emergence of the real entity view in the
early 1900s, Millon notes that when corporations came to be seen as
“private” entities with an identity separate from the state, they were
168
“assimilate[d] . . . to the status of natural persons.” As a result, he
writes that “[c]orporate law . . . lost much of its public character” and
regulatory limitations previously imposed on corporations by state law
were eliminated, while rights previously limited to natural persons
166
See Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle E. Corp., 545 A.2d 1171, 1174
(Del. 1988).
167
Under a Team Production Theory of the firm, the board of directors serves as
a “mediating hierarch” among the competing interests of the firms’ constituencies.
Blair & Stout, supra note 85, at 250−55. Extended to the group level, this approach
implies that directors of each affiliate would mediate the interests of the parent corporation, the group as a whole, and the separate constituencies of that entity.
168
Millon, supra note 1, at 213
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169

began to be extended to corporations. Historically, the real entity
view was associated with an expansion of corporate rights and a narrowing of corporate duties.
However, because the real entity theory conceives of the corporation as sharing the attributes of individuals, it has also been advanced, both in those early years and by more recent commentators,
as offering a stronger grounding for conceptions of corporate morali170
ty.
This implies that the corporation can itself be found morally
culpable, although whether the source of such moral obligations derives from universal norms of human behavior or from narrower
171
norms that are collectively determined remains a subject of debate.
Advocates of the real entity view also emphasize its potential to
ground tighter regulatory controls of the corporation, stronger voluntary commitments to corporate social responsibility, and a better
“fit” between the corporation’s duties and its rights. For example, the
real entity theory was used in the 1930s by E. Merrick Dodd to advocate duties of the corporation to constituencies other than share172
holders.
To be sure, at a practical level, the power of the corporation to
act independently from its shareholders as a “real person” is possible
only if its directors enjoy decision-making discretion, as permitted
173
under state corporate law. The autonomy such rules give to corporate directors can permit them to consider the interests of broader
constituencies, such as employees, local communities, or the envi174
ronment.
Indeed, Berle and Means, whose seminal work on the
rise of the modern corporation rests on an aggregate view that emphasizes the property interests of shareholders, recognized this dimension of the separation of ownership and control and ultimately
concluded that the modern corporation must develop as a system
that operates in the public interest, balancing the interests of diverse
175
constituencies.
However, it is not inevitable that directors will in
fact exercise their discretion in consideration of “public” (i.e., stake169

Id.
See Millon, supra note 1, at 216−20 (discussing Merrick Dodd’s extension of entity theory to ground notions of corporate citizenship); Phillips, supra note 1, at 241’.
171
See, e.g., Peter Muchlinski, Corporate Social Responsibility and International Law:
The Case of Human Rights and Multinational Enterprises, in THE NEW CORPORATE
ACCOUNTABILITY 431, 436–39 (Doreen McBarnet et al. eds., 2007).
172
See Phillips, supra note 1, at 241; Millon, supra note 1, at 216−20.
173
See supra note 87.
174
See Lawrence Mitchell, The Board as a Path to Corporate Social Responsibility, in
THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 171, at 207, 283.
175
BERLE & MEANS, supra note 78, at 312−13.
170
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holder) as well as “private” (i.e., shareholder) interests. In fact, a director primacy model of corporate governance may also be the best
way to advance shareholder wealth maximization, the same normative
objective espoused by advocates of an aggregate theory of the corpo176
ration.
But the possibility that the aggregate and real entity theories
might point in the same direction is a critique going more to empirical questions of how directors and officers exercise their discretion.
At the level of normative principles, a real entity approach clearly
parts course from aggregate theories by positing the corporation as
having an identity, and possibly even a will or moral center, such that
it can ground collective culpability apart from any wrongful act or in177
tent of its directors and officers.
Abstracting to the level of the corporate group, then, a real enterprise perspective implies that the group as a whole bears rights and
obligations that either derive from those of one or more members of
the group or may also be independent. The derivative liability of the
group or one entity within the group, based on wrongful conduct by
another affiliate has been generally rejected within veil-piercing doc178
trine in order to preserve limited liability within the group.
It is,
however, accepted within the major statutory regimes that currently
operate on an enterprise-wide basis; in these areas, derivative liability
is supported by general agency principles of attribution. The emergence of multilateral and transnational regulatory, monitoring, and
enforcement mechanisms that approach the corporate group as a
179
single enterprise rest on similar foundations.
One challenge for a real enterprise approach is identifying the
source of the group’s moral obligation, will, and intent. Where an
independent legal structure represents the group, or where the
group is organized hierarchically so that a parent company or headquarters serves as a unitary “nerve center” for the organization, moral

176

See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 87 (advocating a view of the board of directors
as the center of corporate identity and will, that is, as a “real nexus of contracts”).
177
See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 1, at 242 (arguing that this conclusion is of little
practical importance, since situations where there is “collective fault but individual
blamelessness” are in practice quite rare). Yet it is easy to imagine examples of collective inaction where ordinary negligence of individuals produces wrongful acts or
omissions by the organization as a whole.
178
See generally Thompson, supra note 100.
179
See, e.g., Margaret Blair, Cynthia Williams & Li-wen Lin, The Roles of Standardization, Certification, and Assurance Services in Global Commerce, 4 COMP. RES. L. & POL.
ECON. 1 (2008); see also infra notes 306−07 and accompanying text (identifying multilateral initiatives).
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and legal obligations of the group may be attributable to that entity.
However, further work is needed to explain how collective legal or
moral obligation might be assigned among constituent firms within
the group in light of the diversity of organizational and decisionmaking structures adopted by corporate groups.
III. CORPORATE GROUP THEORY IN THE COURTS

Although concepts of corporate identity have been debated for
quite some time, these issues have recently regained national attention. This Part traces the theories of the corporation and of corporate groups that were developed above through the Supreme Court’s
181
ruling in Citizens United v. FEC and its more recent decision in Janus
182
Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders. It then examines Kiobel
v. Royal Dutch Shell, which at the time of this writing is pending before
the Court and raises key questions about the nature of the corpora183
tion under international law.
These cases illustrate how theoretical perspectives on the personhood of the corporation influence case outcomes and how entitybased views of the corporation fall short when extended to corporate
groups. These examples are not intended to canvass the entire range
of issues involving corporate groups or to survey all of the analytical
approaches courts may take. However, they highlight how understandings of the nature of corporate groups vary across different doctrinal domains. By examining how theories of the corporate group
illuminate some of the tensions in these decisions, this Part also suggests how enterprise-based perspectives might better guide courts in
similar cases.
A. Citizens United v. FEC
In 2008, Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation, sought to
shape the historic campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination. It produced the film Hilary: The Movie, a documentary that por184
trayed then-candidate Hilary Clinton in a less-than-favorable light.
Realizing that the project might fall afoul of federal limits on corpo180

See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1192 (2010) (defining the corporation’s “nerve center”).
181
130 S. Ct. 876, 887 (2010).
182
131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).
183
See infra Part III.C (discussing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d
111 (2d Cir. 2010) and Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., LLC, 643 F.3d 1013
(7th Cir. 2011)).
184
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887.
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rate campaign expenditures, Citizens United sought a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the restrictions and a declaratory
185
judgment, both of which were denied.
The case was appealed to the Supreme Court, and in January
2010 the Court found the challenged limits on corporate campaign
186
expenditures unconstitutional. In so doing, the Court overruled its
earlier decision in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, which had
187
upheld expenditure limits on corporations.
Citizens United elicited
strong reactions from the public and from commentators, and its implications for constitutional law, corporate jurisprudence, and broad188
er public policy debates have proven far-reaching.
An established principle of First Amendment jurisprudence is
that campaign expenditures are speech and indeed “political expres189
sion” that lies “at the core . . . of First Amendment freedoms.”
In
Citizens United, the core question before the Court was the extent to
which restrictions on the political speech of juridical persons, including corporations and labor unions, could be imposed consistent with
190
the First Amendment.
The Court held that no distinction can be
made between natural persons and corporations for purposes of the
First Amendment and that corporations’ right to freedom of speech

185

Citizens United challenged federal restrictions imposed under § 441b of the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006), as amended by the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 203, 116
Stat. 81, 91 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006)). These restrictions prohibited corporations or unions from “using their general treasury funds to make independent
expenditures on speech [that is] an ‘electioneering communication’ or for speech
that expressly advocates the election or defeat of a candidate.” Citizens United, 130 S.
Ct. at 887.
186
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 917.
187
494 U.S. 652 (1990).
188
The Citizens United decision prompted President Obama to take the unusual
step of criticizing a Supreme Court decision publicly, which he did in his 2010 State
of the Union speech. President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27,
2010), in 156 CONG. REC. H418 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 2010). In response to widespread
public outrage about the decision, legislation was also proposed in Congress to reconfirm that corporate expenditures by foreign-owned companies are within the existing ban on election expenditures by foreign nationals. See 2 U.S.C. § 441(e)
(2006); see also Democracy Is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Election
Act (DISCLOSE Act), H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. § 102 (2010). Most recently, a petition
has been filed with the SEC urging adoption of corporate political contribution disclosure requirements in the wake of Citizens United. See Editorial, Serving Shareholders
and Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2011, at A22.
189
Austin, 494 U.S., at 656–57 (internal citations omitted).
190
The Court had previously recognized the First Amendment rights of corporations in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 (1978).
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under the Constitution is coextensive with that of natural persons.
In reaching this conclusion, the majority opinion drew on multiple
perspectives of corporate personhood without acknowledging the in192
herent contradictions among those approaches. It also disregarded
the extension of its holding to corporate groups whose voices are
most likely to shape the landscape of future elections.
Corporations are nowhere mentioned in the text of the Constitution, and the question of whether particular constitutional rights of
193
194
“citizens” or “the people”
should be extended to corporations
has not been answered systematically by the Court. The analysis typically turns on whether the rights at issue are “purely personal” and
therefore limited to natural persons—an inquiry which depends “on
the nature, history, and purpose of the particular constitutional pro195
vision.”
Although corporations now enjoy many constitutional
rights that are deemed to run to the entity itself, recent commentary
196
observes the utter lack of a unified doctrine.
191
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898−908. The Court upheld the constitutionality of
federal disclosure requirements and left intact the longstanding federal ban on direct corporate campaign contributions under 18 U.S.C. § 608(b) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. Id. at 901–02, 908.
192
For further commentary on the conceptions of corporate personhood reflected in the Citizens United decision, see generally Avi-Yonah, supra note 1; Darrell A. H.
Miller, Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, and the Future of Corporate Constitutional
Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887 (2011); Anne Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate
Law Analysis of Free Speech and Corporate Personhood in Citizens United, 61 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 497 (2011); Roger Coffin, A Responsibility to Speak: Citizens United, Corporate
Governance and Managing Risks (Weinberg Ctr. for Corporate Governance Working
Paper Series, Paper No. 01-11, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1766583.
193
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. pmbl., art. III, § 2.
194
See, e.g., id. art. I, § 2.
195
This test was articulated by Justice Powell in Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778 n.14 (stating that corporations generally enjoy Constitutional protections other than
“[c]ertain purely personal guarantees” (citation omitted)).
196
Miller, supra note 192, at 909. Miller describes the Court’s jurisprudence as a
“grab bag of history, metaphysical rumination, Lochnerian tailings, and pragmatism to
resolve the specific corporate constitutional claim at hand . . . . a string cite rather
than a doctrine.” Id. at 909. He summarizes the state of corporate constitutional
rights as follows:
Today, corporations possess some First Amendment free speech and
press rights, some rights of expressive association, and (perhaps) some
right to free exercise. They enjoy Fourth Amendment rights against
unreasonable searches but only a limited right to privacy. Corporations
possess Fifth Amendment rights against double jeopardy and takings
but no rights against self-incrimination. The Sixth Amendment guarantees corporations a right to trial by jury and to counsel but not a right
to appointed counsel. Corporations are “citizens” for purposes of Article III powers, but not “citizens” for purposes of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
Corporations are “persons” with Fourteenth
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The Court’s fundamental holding—that corporation are “speakers” entitled to voice in the political process on par with individual
citizens—clearly espouses a real entity conception of corporate personhood. Relying on its pre-Austin line of cases, which had invalidated corporate campaign expenditure restrictions, the Court repeatedly referred to the corporation as having its own “voice” and message
that should not be restricted in the marketplace of ideas. Writing for
the majority, Justice Kennedy concluded, “[S]uppressing the speech
of . . . corporations . . . prevents their voices from reaching the pub197
lic.”
In so doing, the Court also distinguished the corporation’s
“voice” from that of its shareholders. It concluded that any interest
in protecting shareholders from being compelled to promote the
corporation’s political views through their investment dollars was in198
sufficient to justify restricting the corporation’s political speech. The
speech rights of shareholders who do not approve of corporate
speech, the majority wrote, can be addressed “through the proce199
dures of corporate democracy,” namely, director elections.
In the
majority’s view, then, the corporation has a real identity as a “speaker” independent from its constituents and thus indistinguishable (at
least for First Amendment purposes) from an individual citizen.
Amendment rights to equal protection and procedural due process
and some, but not all, of the incorporated Bill of Rights. Corporations
are also “persons” who may spend money to influence voters, but they
cannot themselves become voters under the Fourteenth, Fifteenth,
Nineteenth, or Twenty-Fourth Amendments.
Id. at 910–11 (internal citations omitted).
197
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 907 (2010) (emphasis added).
198
See, e.g., id. at 911 (concluding that a potential disagreement by a media corporation’s shareholders “with the political views the newspaper expresses” do not justify
“restrict[ing] the media corporation’s political speech” (emphasis added)); see also John
Coffee, Corporate Governance After Citizens United, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 18, 2010, at 2 (observing that this argument implies that all federally required securities disclosures are
compelled speech). The argument that corporate campaign contributions force investors to subsidize “compelled political speech” is based in part on the fact that, prior to Citizens United, corporations were not required to disclose these contributions to
investors, preventing them from exiting investments in companies that contribute to
campaigns they oppose. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83 (2010) (advocating for heightened
review of corporate political speech decisions under state corporate law); Tucker,
supra note 192, at 514, 533–41 (outlining the compelled speech arguments in Citizens
United). More than a dozen states have introduced new disclosure rules in the wake
of Citizens United. Kenneth P. Doyle, More States Passing Disclosure Laws in Response to
Citizens United Ruling, BNA CORP. L. DAILY, Dec. 8, 2011.
199
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911 (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794). But see id. at
977−79 (noting the inability of corporate law to provide an adequate remedy) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Tucker, supra note 192, at 533−41 (explaining the limits
of effective remedies to the compelled speech challenge).
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However, another rationale relied on by the Citizens United majority reflects instead an aggregate view of the corporation that emphasizes the underlying rights of the shareholders and other individuals constituting the corporate entity. Similar reasoning had been
previously followed by the Court in Buckley v. Valeo, a pre-Austin First
200
Amendment case.
There, the Court had held that limits on independent associations’ campaign expenditures restricted the speech
201
rights of their members. In the same vein, the Citizens United majority concluded that the challenged restrictions on corporate speech
represent a “ban [on] the political speech of millions of associations of
202
Elsewhere, the Court also acknowledged concerns that
citizens.”
corporate speech might reflect the views of shareholders, some of
203
whom might be foreign nationals.
At the same time, the majority failed to clarify how the corporation is itself a “speaker” if its speech and its rights to speak are merely
derived from its constituents. More critically, it failed to explain its
understanding of which constituents’ voices the corporation represents. As the dissent observed, corporate officers and other employees do not voice their own personal views when they speak as agents
204
of the corporation.
Yet as noted above, the Court equivocated on
the issue of whether the corporation’s voice is the voice of its shareholders. Corporate law does not permit the shareholders to “dictate”
the corporate “message” to the board of directors or management,
nor can it be assumed that shareholders of large public corporations
share identical interests, particularly political views, that could be
205
otherwise imposed on the corporation itself.
This lack of connection between corporate voice and any specific constituency may indicate that the Citizens United majority ultimately holds a real entity view
200

424 U.S. 1, 25−26 (1976).
Id. at 22.
202
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 907 (emphasis added); see also id. at 928 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he individual person’s right to speak includes the right to speak in
association with other individual persons.”).
203
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911 (“We need not reach the question of whether
the Government has a compelling interest in preventing foreign individuals or associations,” that is to say, “corporations or associations that were created in foreign
countries or funded predominately by foreign shareholders” from “influencing our
Nation’s political process.”). Federal law already imposes such restrictions. See 2
U.S.C. § 441(e) (2006). The constitutionality of these restrictions was recently upheld. Bluman v. FEC, 800 F.Supp.2d 281 (D.D.C. 2011) (rejecting a First Amendment challenged based in part on Citizens United), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012).
204
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 972 (Stevens J., dissenting in part).
205
See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60
STAN. L. REV. 1255 (2008) (discussing divergence of shareholder interests).
201
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of the corporation, but this position is inconsistent with the opinion’s
stated rationale, which rests on individual speech rights.
The Court in Citizens United considered only in passing the implications of its holding for corporate groups. A key rationale behind
Austin was that the unique economic and legal characteristics of corporations heightened the risk of corruption and the possibility of
206
corporate “voice” dominating political debate.
In discounting the
Austin Court’s concerns of corporate expenditures “distorting” political debate, the Court pointed to media conglomerates as corporate
organizations quintessentially at the core of First Amendment protections despite their ability to amass wealth in support of particular
207
messages. Reflecting a real enterprise approach, the Court’s opinion throughout assumes that media conglomerates speak with one
208
voice. The majority also sympathized with concerns that campaign
expenditures by the U.S. subsidiary of a foreign parent might “speak”
209
with the voice of its parent or controlling shareholder.
This too
implies a real enterprise perspective, that is, a view that a U.S.-based
corporate entity within a corporate group might not “speak” with its
own “voice” (in dollar terms) but rather on behalf of the entire corporate family.
A real enterprise view of the corporate group as a speaker in its
own right is consistent with the Citizens United holding. It also comports better with the reality of corporations’ ability to promote a unified corporate image, brand, and “message,” the complex nature of
corporate decision-making, and the common law fiduciary duties of
corporate directors and officers. As acknowledged by the dissent,
corporate “voice” does not necessarily reflect the views of any corporate constituency, whether it is the shareholders, directors, officers,
206
See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658–59 (1990) (upholding restrictions on corporate political expenditures). The Court also rejected
the policy argument found persuasive by the Austin majority that restrictions on corporate spending were necessary to prevent corporations “from obtaining ‘an unfair
advantage in the political marketplace’ by virtue of their economic wealth.” Id. at
659 (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986)). The
Court held that “First Amendment protections do not depend on the speaker’s ‘financial ability to engage in public discussion.’” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904
(quoting Buckley v. Valejo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976)).
207
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 905−06 (noting that media corporations are exempted from BCRA’s ban on corporate expenditures).
208
See, e.g., id. at 911 (considering circumstances where shareholders of a media
corporation might oppose “the political views the newspaper expresses” but finding
such interests insufficient to justify restricting the corporation’s political speech (emphasis
added)).
209
See supra note 203 and accompanying text (addressing concerns about potential foreign influence on federal elections).
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210

or other employees.
Distinguishing corporate “voice” from the
corporation’s human constituents in this way might have influenced
the Court to credit concerns about corporate power and the potential
distortion and “drowning out” of individual voice, but the majority
opinion soundly rejects these rationales.
The corporations whose “voice” the majority explicitly sought to
protect are “small corporations without large amounts of wealth,”
which make up the majority (in numbers but not in dollar terms) of
211
corporate taxpayers and employers. However, when corporate donors are in fact corporate groups, they are no longer associations of
individuals but associations of other corporations—in other words,
“polycorporate networks.” Although the corporate group, too, is a
(larger) association of individuals, citizens’ expectation of communicating politically through the corporate form is certainly attenuated
when they know that their participation (i.e., investment) will be filtered through a corporate group. Had citizens’ expectations been
understood this way, the risk of restrictions on individual voice might
have posed less of a concern to the Court.
Once the group is understood to be the speaker, critical advantages corporations enjoy over individuals, such as “limited liability . . . perpetual life, and . . . favorable treatment of the accumulation
and distribution of assets” might also have weighed more heavily in
212
the majority’s analysis. Instead, the Court interpreted its earlier decision in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti to prohibit “restrictions
213
Taking into account an
distinguishing among different speakers.”
enterprise perspective might have motivated the Court to credit the
anti-distortion rationale of Austin over the anti-discrimination rationale of Bellotti.
A final issue in Citizens United concerns the boundaries of the
corporate group. Advocates of the limitations on corporate “speech”
had argued that the corporation’s ability to establish a political action
210
See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 972 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (noting that
because the corporation’s personhood is only “a useful legal fiction” and that corporations are not “members of ‘We the People’,” but neither is the corporation speaking for its human constituents; observing further that “[i]t is an interesting question
‘who’ is even speaking when a business corporation places a[] [candidate] advertisement”).
211
Id. at 907 (majority opinion)(citing evidence that ninety-six percent of the
members of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce have less than one hundred employees).
212
See id. at 971 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part)(citing Austin v. Mich. Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658−59 (1990)).
213
Id. at 898−99 (citing First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784
(1978)).
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committee (PAC) through which expenditures could be made already gave the corporation an avenue to express its views, a position
214
supported by the Court’s earlier decision in Austin. Adopting a real
entity view of the PAC, the Court rejected this argument. It emphasized the corporation’s formal legal separation from its PAC as cutting off any means for the corporation to meaningfully “speak” in po215
litical campaigns.
Thus, Justice Kennedy concluded that the
challenged prohibition on corporate independent expenditures was
an “outright ban . . . notwithstanding the fact that a PAC created by a
corporation can still speak, for a PAC is a separate association from the
216
corporation.”
To be sure, corporations are prohibited from contributing cor217
porate treasury funds to the PAC. However, the Court could have
found the PAC to be part of the corporate group—a real enterprise
approach—while still recognizing the independence of the PAC as a
“separate segregated fund” holding non-corporate assets contributed
by others. Viewed this way, the PAC is analogous to a minority subsidiary, and its views could be identified both with the founding corporation and with direct PAC contributors. The Court declined to do
so, despite the fact that a corporate PAC is formed, supported, and in
218
fact controlled by the corporation. Interestingly, under campaign finance law, separate PACs of a parent and a subsidiary are consolidat219
ed for purposes of applicable funding limits. The regulations view
these separate PACs as affiliated with a single “enterprise,” even
though as a matter of campaign finance law, the Court determined
that the voice of the PACs is not the voice of the corporate group itself.

214

See Austin, 494 U.S. at 660−61. PACs established by corporations or unions may
engage in “express advocacy” and “electioneering communications.” 2 U.S.C. §
441b(b)(2) (2006).
215
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 8 at 897–98 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
216
Id. at 882 (emphasis added).
217
2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (2006).
218
11 C.F.R. § 114.5(d) (2012) (“A corporation . . . may exercise control over its
separate segregated fund.”).
219
2 U.S.C. § 441(a)(4)–(5) (2006); 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.5(g)(2), 110.3(a)(2)(i)
(2011); see Walther v. FEC, 468 F. Supp. 1235, 1239 (D.D.C. 1979) (“[I]f two or more
PACs are controlled by one person or one group of persons, then the PACs should
be treated as one PAC for purposes of controlling political contributions.”). The
D.C. Circuit has recently held limits on certain individual contributions to PACs unconstitutional as applied, though without particular reference to the rules on parentsubsidiary consolidation. SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(challenging the individual contribution limits of 2 U.S.C. § 441(a)(a)(1)(C) and
441(a)(a)(3)).
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Whatever its deficiencies in other respects, the Citizens United
opinion rings true in its implicit understanding of the corporation as
conveying messages that cannot be identified with any individual or
group of individuals within the corporation. Yet the majority opinion
failed to adequately consider the implications of its holding for large
corporations—that is, corporate groups. The majority opinion also
illustrates how the Court has drawn on competing theories of corporate personhood to ground its decisions in constitutional cases. The
tensions between these views led the Court to give undue weight to
the “nondiscrimination” rationales of Bellotti and to unduly discount
Austin’s concerns about the potential distortive influence of corporate campaign expenditures.
B. Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders
Less than a year after Citizens United, the Supreme Court in FCC
v. AT&T, Inc. confirmed that its concept of the “real” personhood of
the corporation did not automatically extend to other contexts, par220
ticularly where federal statutes provide guidance to the contrary.
This result is consistent with the evidence presented elsewhere in this
Article of considerable variation in courts’ views of the corporation
and the corporate group across different areas of the law. In Janus
Capital, decided in June 2011, the Supreme Court again confronted
questions of corporate identity but in the very different context of the
221
federal securities laws.
Janus Capital involved claims under Securities and Exchange
222
Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5 by shareholders of Janus Capital
Group, Inc. (JCG) against JCG and its wholly owned subsidiary, Janus
223
Capital Management, LLC (JCM). Rule 10b-5 under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 makes it unlawful for “any person, directly or
indirectly . . . [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact” in
224
JCM served as
connection with the purchase or sale of securities.
the investment advisor to Janus Investment Fund (the “Fund”), spe220
131 S. Ct. 1177 (2011) (rejecting AT&T’s argument that it had a “personal privacy” interest in certain law enforcement records under exemption 7(C) of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C)).
221
Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).
222
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).
223
Janus Capital, 131 S. Ct. at 2299–300.
224
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012) (emphasis added). Rule 10b-5 implements Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which makes it “unlawful for any
person, directly or indirectly . . . [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance.” 15
U.S.C. § 78j (2006).
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cifically a Massachusetts business trust, which was owned entirely by
225
the mutual fund’s investors. The JCG shareholders alleged that because the investment advisor JCM, acting under the control of JCG,
“participat[ed] in the writing and dissemination” of misleading
statements in the Janus Investment Fund prospectus, JCM was in fact
the “maker” of the statements and thus a direct violator of Rule 10b226
5.
When the misleading nature of the statements was publicly revealed, investors withdrew funds from the Janus Investment Fund,
227
which caused a decline in the value of JCG stock as well.
The decision in Janus Capital Group hinged on whether the
Court would adopt an “enterprise” analysis with respect to JCM and
the Fund and required the Court to consider the contours of the
corporate group. Like Citizens United, the case also raised questions
regarding the source of corporate speech but in a statutory rather
than a constitutional context.
In contrast to the constitutional arena, cases involving the extension of statutory rights and obligations to corporations begin from
the definition of “person” in the statute at issue. In most federal statutes, “person” is defined to include corporations and other organiza228
229
tions. Few statutes explicitly define the corporate group. Whether a court approaches the corporate group from an enterprise or
entity perspective generally depends upon its interpretation of the
text and purpose of the statute as they pertain to the (i) “the nature
of the group interrelationship, consisting of the intertwined structure
and operations,” and (ii) the importance of enterprise principles to
230
furthering “the objectives of the law in the legal area involved.”
Where the statutory regime contains provisions specifically directed
at corporate groups, the statutory definition of “control” and general

225

Janus Capital, 131 S. Ct. at 2299.
Id.
227
Id. at 2299−300.
228
See, e.g., Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (defining “person” as used in federal statutes to include corporations and other business organizations).
229
See supra Part II.A and note 32. The term “affiliate” is however defined in numerous contexts. See, e.g., infra note 236 and accompanying text. A number of regulatory regimes use other terms to delimit the corporate group, such as “integrated
enterprise” under federal labor law, the “unitary business” doctrine under constitutional law, and “enterprise” under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. See Phillip Blumberg, The Corporate Entity
in an Era of Multinational Corporations, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 283, 345−60 (1990).
230
BLUMBERG, supra note 2, at 119 (noting that this is also the general standard
courts use to determine whether common law rules should apply on an enterprise or
entity level).
226
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agency principles will generally dictate whether an enterprise or enti231
ty analysis applies.
Under Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
“[e]very person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable”
232
for violations of the securities laws is also subject to liability. Section
20(b) imposes liability on violations accomplished through interme233
diaries. The definition of “control” under the securities laws is expansive and is “to be construed liberally” in light of the remedial
234
purposes of the statute. It is defined broadly as “the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the
management and policies of a person, whether through the ownership
235
of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.” Federal securities regulations define an “affiliate” as “a person that directly, or indirectly
through one or more intermediaries, controls or is controlled by, or
236
is under common control with” another.
In Janus Capital, the identity of the “maker” of the misleading
statements depended on whether the relationship between the defendant entities was viewed from an entity or enterprise perspective.
The parties had acknowledged that JCG “controlled” its wholly owned
subsidiary JCM, as defined by Section 20(a). Accordingly, JCG would
have been an indirect violator of Rule 10b-5 if JCM had been found
directly liable since the two would be deemed to have “made” the
237
statements as a single speaker—an enterprise view.
However, Justice Thomas, writing for the 5-4 majority, concluded that the relationship between JCM and the Fund did not fit within the definition of
231

See id. at 101, 119.
15 U.S.C.A. § 78t(a) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011) (emphasis added).
233
Id. § 78t(b).
234
See, e.g., Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 974 F.2d 873, 880 (7th Cir.
1992).
235
17 C.F.R. § 230.405(b) (2012) (emphasis added) (defining “control” under the
Securities Act of 1933); see, e.g., SEC v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (applying
this definition for purposes of controlling person liability under Section 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Harrison, 974 F.2d 873 (same); SEC v. Int’l Chem.
Dev. Corp., 469 F.2d 20 (10th Cir. 1972) (defining control within the definition of an
underwriter under Securities Act Section 2(11)); see also 17 C.F.R. § 260.0-2(b)
(2012) (adopting the same definition under the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15
U.S.C. § 77aaa).
236
17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2012) (defining “affiliate” under the Securities Act of
1933); see also id. § 260.0-2(f) (adopting the same definition under the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. 77aaa). This definition is also part of the definition of
“affiliated person” under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (ICA), 15 U.S.C.A. §
80a-2(3) (West Supp. 2011).
237
Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2301 n.5
(2011).
232
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“control” under Section 20(a) and that JCM did not otherwise have
238
“direct” or “ultimate” control over the misleading statements.
Accordingly, the majority held that JCM could not be held liable for any
239
Rule 10b-5 violations of the Fund itself.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court adopted a formalistic entity-level view of the corporate structure. It relied primarily on the
fact that corporate formalities were observed in the formation and
operation of the Fund, that JCM and the Fund were not under common ownership, and that the prospectus was filed solely in the name
240
of the Fund.
In addition, only one of the Janus Investment Fund
directors was simultaneously a director of JCM, making the Fund’s
board of trustees “independent” of JCM, as required by the Invest241
ment Company Act of 1940 (the ‘40 Act). The Court thus adopted
a real entity approach of the Fund as an independent speaker, with
242
its board exercising “ultimate control” over its communications.
Like the PAC in Citizens United, the formally independent mutual
fund structure at issue in Janus Capital lies near the outer edge of
what might be considered an enterprise under core conceptions of
the corporate group—it is similar in many respects to a joint venture
or other contractual relationship. However, as the dissent noted,
JCM employees implemented the Janus Funds’ strategies and handled its daily operations, and all the officers of the Janus Investment
Fund were also officers of JCM—the Fund was in fact a “captive” mu243
tual fund.
Without joint ownership or direct board control, the
Fund was formally, if not functionally, independent of JCM in the
eyes of the Court. Viewed in this way, the relationship between the
mutual fund and JCM was defined by services and other contracts, so
the Court could simply view the fund as a client who had hired an investment advisor and its management team—not part of the same
corporate group.
Under this view of the corporate group then, JCM as an independent third party could be liable only for aiding and abetting the
Fund’s 10b-5 violation—an act for which no recognized private right
238

Id. at 2305.
Id. at 2299, 2304.
240
Id. at 2304.
241
The ICA permits up to sixty percent of the board of a mutual fund to be composed of “interested persons.” 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-2(a)(19) (West 2009 & Supp. 2011).
242
Janus Capital, 131 S. Ct. at 2302.
243
Id. at 2306 (Breyer J., dissenting); see Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P., 130 S. Ct.
1418, 1421 (2010) (acknowledging the lack of practical independence between mutual funds and their investment advisers and referring to mutual fund clients established by an affiliate of the adviser as “captive mutual funds”).
239
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244

of action exists. Alternatively, the Janus majority left open the possibility that an investment advisor such as JCM could be held liable
under Section 20(b) of the Exchange Act in circumstances where the
captive mutual fund might be an “innocent intermediary” of fraud by
245
JCM. Absent such a claim, the only way to render investment advisors directly liable for misleading disclosures they prepare may then
be to require them to separately execute or attest to them, as John
246
Coffee has proposed.
In contrast, the dissent argued, in essence, that JCM and the
Fund should be viewed as a real enterprise—that is, as a single
247
“speaker” collectively communicating through the Fund prospectus.
Justice Breyer, writing for the dissent, observed: “Nothing in the English language prevents one from saying that several different individuals, separately or together, ‘make’ a statement that each has a hand
248
in producing.”
Even though the core indicia of the corporate
group were lacking for purposes of indirect liability as a controlled entity under Section 20(a), for the dissent, the two entities could nonetheless be viewed as contributing to a collective communication—
essentially, the product of a joint enterprise.
Had the Court adopted an aggregate enterprise approach emphasizing the interests of the Fund investors (which did not include
JCM), it might also have concluded that their implicit (and likely explicit) contract with the Fund included an agreement that JCM would
“speak” on the Fund’s behalf by supplying its officers and management services and producing its required disclosures. Either enterprise approach might better have advanced the regulatory goals of
Rule 10b-5 to protect investors and ensure the accountability of investment professionals. Instead, the majority ruling allows investment
advisers to insulate themselves from Rule 10b-5 liability for captive

244

Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S.
164 (1994).
245
See Janus Capital, 131 S. Ct. at 2304 n.10. In Janus, the plaintiff had not made
any alternative claims under § 20b of the Exchange Act. Id. at 2311 (Breyer J., dissenting).
246
See John C. Coffee, Jr., U.S. Supreme Court and Securities Litigation, N.Y. L.J., July
21, 2011.
247
See Janus Capital, 131 S. Ct. at 2310 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the issue is not whether JCM is indirectly liable under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act
for control of the guilty Fund but whether JCM is itself “directly liable” as the maker
of the statements).
248
Id. at 2307.
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mutual funds that they manage to an extent not permitted by the
249
Court’s earlier rulings.
The flexibility conferred by modern corporate and investment
law, contract, and the diversification of business entity forms has
made defining clear boundaries for the corporate group or firm as a
unified enterprise difficult. Janus Capital illustrates the types of principles courts look to in considering whether to view independent entities as part of a single enterprise and the policy implications of a
strict entity-based approach.
In many contexts, there are good reasons to limit the bounds of
the corporate group to entities linked by direct equity interests and
control. First, this narrow approach gives due regard to the formal
legal structure of the group. Second, it distinguishes unified enterprises more clearly from general agency relationships. Third, it is the
combination of ownership and control that contributes to the efficiency of the corporate group as an organizational form even as it
creates the potential for abuse. Hence, the need for regulatory intervention. While not justified everywhere, Janus Capital shows, however, that in some contexts, such as securities law, the interrelationship
between the entities involved as well as the incentives that an entitybased rule creates might justify broader perspectives of the corporate
group. In this regard, the Janus Capital majority’s position illustrates
the limits of control-based definitions of the corporate group, while
the dissent shows how other factors—such as decision-making control
and oversight authority—support a more expansive view.
C. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.
Thus far, this Article has considered the corporate group without reference to multinational enterprises. However, many of the
most challenging regulatory and policy debates surrounding corporate groups arise because of their global reach. Any consideration of
the nature of the corporate group must therefore consider the inter250
sections of domestic and international legal regimes. At the time of
this writing, a decision is pending before the Supreme Court in the
case of Kiobel, which raises the issue of corporate status and identity
251
under international law. The case applies customary international
249

Id. at 2308 (questioning the majority’s reading of First Interstate Bank of Denver).
For a more complete treatment, see generally MUCHLINSKI, supra note 2;
Reuven Avi-Yonah, National Regulation of Multinational Enterprises: An Essay on Comity,
Extraterritoriality, and Harmonization, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 5 (2003).
251
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010). The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Kiobel case on Oct. 17, 2011. Kiobel v. Royal
250
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law in one of the few contexts where it has direct bearing on the obligations of global corporate groups—human rights litigation under
252
the Alien Tort Statute.
1.

The Multinational Challenge

There is no uniform definition of a multinational, and its
boundaries are not necessarily limited to the legal structure of affili253
ated entities linked by shareholdings.
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) uses the term “multinational enterprise” (MNE) to refer to “companies or other entities
established in more than one country and so linked that they may
254
co-ordinate their operations in various ways.” The United Nations
defines the “transnational corporation,” a generally parallel term, as
“an economic entity [or entities] operating in two or more countries—whatever their legal form, whether in their home country or
255
country of activity, and whether taken individually or collectively.”

Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011) (No. 10-1491). The case was heard with
Mohamad v. Rajoub, 634 F. 3d 604 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. granted 132 S. Ct. 454 (2011)
(No. 11-88), a case involving similar issues under a related statute, the Torture Victims Protection Act.
252
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (giving district courts “original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations”). According to an exhaustive survey conducted by Michael Van Alstine, there are in fact
at least 115 federal statutes requiring the courts to interpret and apply standards defined with reference to international law. See E-mail from Michael P. Van Alstine,
Professor of Law, Univ. of Md. Sch. of Law, to Virginia Harper Ho, Associate Professor of Law, Kansas Univ. Sch. of Law (Jan. 28, 2011, 10:07 AM) (on file with author).
However, the vast majority concern maritime law and the law of war and are of less
direct relevance to multinationals outside related industries.
253
See MUCHLINSKI, supra note 2, at 57–82; see also ORG. FOR ECON, CO-OPERATION &
DEV., OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 9, ¶ 2 (2008), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf (“Multinational enterprises,
like their domestic counterparts, have evolved to encompass a broader range of
business arrangements and organisational forms. Strategic alliances and closer relations with suppliers and contractors tend to blur the boundaries of the enterprise.”).
254
See ORG. FOR ECON, CO-OPERATION & DEV, OECD GUIDELINES FOR
MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES
17,
¶
4
(2011),
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/29/48004323.pdf (noting that “a precise definition of multinational enterprises is not required for the purposes of the Guidelines”).
255
See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, ¶ 20,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003), available at
http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G03/160/08/PDF/G0316008.pdf?OpenElement
(approved by U.N. Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion & Protection of Human Rights
Res. 2003/16, Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
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In this Article, however, the term is used more narrowly to refer to a
corporate group linked by shareholding rather than contractual rela256
tionships.
According to the United Nations’ 2011 World Investment Report, multinational corporate groups currently account for onefourth of the world’s gross domestic product and one-third of all
257
global exports. A recent report on the role of corporate groups in
Europe observed that “the international group of companies—not
the single company—has become the prevailing form of European
258
large-sized enterprises.”
In the United States, multinationals also
259
account for a significant percentage of the national economy.
As a matter of organizational structure, management, sheer economic power, and indeed, identity, global corporate groups can be
viewed most consistently from a real enterprise perspective as
260
“polycorporate business networks.” Regardless of whether they are
recognized as having independent “citizenship” or formal legal status
within a given jurisdiction, corporate groups operate with a collective
identity that is often embodied in a global brand or other symbol of
corporate identity. From a management standpoint as well, multinational corporate group operations are characterized by the global coordination of legally independent parts to advance a common eco261
nomic strategy. Indeed, these realities are consistent with theories
Enetreprises with Regrad to Human Rights, 55th Sess., Aug. 26, 2003, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/L.11, at 52 ( Aug 26, 2003)).
256
This view is in line with other commentators who use the term “multinational
corporation” to refer to firms that “invest directly in foreign facilities and hold management accountable for foreign activities” rather than all firms engaged in contracts
with foreign parties. See, e.g., DINE, supra note 2, at 41 (citations omitted).
257
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, Switz., June
27–29, 2011, World Investment Report 2011, at xiii (July 26, 2011), available at
http://www.unctad-docs.org/files/UNCTAD-WIR2011-Full-en.pdf.
258
ANTUNES ET AL., supra note 27, at 59.
259
See, e.g., JONATHAN CUMMINGS ET AL., MCKINSEY, GROWTH AND COMPETITIVENESS
IN THE UNITED STATES: THE ROLE OF ITS MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES, (2010), available
at
http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/publications/role_of_us_multinational_companies/
index.asp (reporting that as of 2007, U.S. multinationals accounted for one percent
of all U.S. companies but contribute twenty-three percent of all private sector GDP).
260
For a discussion of the term “polycorporate network,” see supra notes 135−39
and accompanying text.
261
Catá Backer, supra note 2, at 556; see also supra note 126 and sources cited
therein (analyzing strategic considerations impacting multinational group structures); ANTUNES ET AL. supra note 27, at 59 (concluding that “group management is
the heart of the [multinational enterprise]: the main reason for its success consists in
the sophisticated and flexible management issuing from the optimal combination of
central control exercised by the parent and local autonomy granted to subsidiaries.”)
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of the firm based on transaction cost economics wherein corporate
groups can be understood as unified economic organizations.
Although the rise of multinational corporate groups has delinked corporations from ties to geographic and regulatory jurisdictions, international and domestic legal regimes remain territorially
262
bounded. This has enabled multinationals to engage in regulatory
arbitrage, shifting operations and assets to the most favorable (i.e.,
weakest) regulatory jurisdictions, and in asset partitioning, strategically shielding corporate assets by isolating riskier operations in separate
263
legal entities, each with limited liability.
Ultimately, the juxtaposition of geographically bounded sovereign nation-states as regulators
and the emergence of business entities whose operations transcend
such boundaries has weakened the power of any one state to regulate
264
the corporation as a whole.
Theories of the corporate group offer a new way to articulate
this well-known dilemma⎯namely, that a transnational corporate
group in fact exists as a “real enterprise” in an ontological sense beyond the bounds of its legal structure but that current regulatory
tools can respond only at the level of the group’s constituent parts, in
other words, an “aggregate enterprise” approach. This regulatory gap
is most evident in the rising number of claims by involuntary tort
265
creditors against major multinationals. One of the most prominent
of the recent cases raising such claims is Kiobel.
2.

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. and Alien Tort Claims
Jurisprudence

From 1993 to 1994, Nigerian military forces engaged in a campaign of murder, rape, and destruction against local activists in the
Ogoni region of Nigeria who had protested the environmental im262
The challenges of regulating multinationals through traditional territorially
grounded legal regimes have been much noted. See, e.g., MUCHLINSKI, supra note 2,
at 123−71 (analyzing the jurisdictional limits of MNE regulation through national or
regional law); Catá Backer, supra note 2, at 543−44 (noting that “emerging patterns
of economic globalization . . . expose the limitations of theorizing that is grounded
on . . . principles” of territoriality and a hierarchy of legal sources premised on the
ultimate authority of the state or sovereign); Hansen, supra note 119; Detlev F. Vagts,
The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational Law, 83 HARV. L. REV.
739 (1969).
263
See, e.g., Catá Backer, supra note 2, at 543 (on asset partitioning and its rationales); Iacobucci & Triantis, supra note 31.
264
See, e.g., id.
265
A recent Westlaw search of all reported cases litigating Alien Tort Statute
(ATS) claims since 1997 revealed that of a total of 645 cases, over 500 involved corporations (search conducted Apr. 12, 2012).
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266

pact of oil exploration. They did so allegedly at the behest of and
with the direct assistance of a subsidiary of Royal Dutch Petroleum
267
and Shell Transport and Trading Company PLC.
After litigation
268
spanning more than fifteen years, a panel of the Second Circuit
held in September 2010 that corporations, as juridical entities, are
not “persons” under international law and therefore cannot be sued
269
under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). Like nearly every other circuit
to consider the question, the Second Circuit had previously assumed
270
without deciding that the ATS recognized corporate defendants.
Only the Eleventh Circuit had squarely confronted the issue, and it
271
had upheld corporate liability under the ATS. Since Kiobel was decided, the D.C. Circuit and the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have ex272
pressly ruled on the issue of corporate liability under the ATS. All
have sided with the Eleventh Circuit and rejected the position taken
by the Second Circuit panel majority.
On July 8, 2011, the D.C. Circuit first rejected Kiobel’s conclusions in Doe v. Exxon Mobil, a case involving alleged torture, murder,
and various torts committed by Indonesian military personnel hired
as security by Exxon Mobil to guard its natural gas facility in Aceh,
266

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010).
Id. Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, Ltd. (SPDC) is the Nigerian subsidiary of the other named corporate defendants. Id. at 123. Plaintiffs,
Nigerian citizens, alleged that Dutch, British, and Nigerian companies, which were
engaged via a multi-layered corporate structure in oil exploration in 1993, paid the
government and provided transport to the Nigerian army, which raped and murdered civilian activists. Id.
268
Litigation by residents of the Ogoni region of Nigeria commenced on November 6, 1996, in the case of Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir.
2000). Kiobel had been pending nearly a decade by the time the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to hear the case in October 2011. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 1:02cv07618 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 20, 2002) (initial class action filing).
269
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 112–13.
270
See, e.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244
(2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 122 (2010); see also Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran,
Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 163 (5th Cir. 1999) (entertaining claims against a corporate defendant where no challenge to corporate liability was raised). The Fourth Circuit
recently considered claims against corporate defendants under the ATS where defendants failed to raise a timely challenge to the use of the ATS against corporate defendants. Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388 (4th Cir. 2011).
271
See Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1263 (11th Cir. 2009) (following Romero for the proposition that “corporate defendants are subject to liability defendants under the ATS”); Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th
Cir. 2008).
272
Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Flomo v. Firestone
Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 2011 (7th Cir. 2011); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC,
671 F.3d 736, 748 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. petition filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3335 (U.S.
Nov. 23, 2011) (No. 11-649).
267
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273

Indonesia. Relying on the Supreme Court’s de cision in Argentine
Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., the court refused to distinguish between individual and corporate defendants for purposes of
274
ATS liability. Three days later the Seventh Circuit followed suit in
Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., a case against Firestone affiliates
275
involving alleged child labor in Liberia.
Judge Posner, writing for
the Seventh Circuit in Flomo, concluded that so long as the corporation’s actions are condoned at the “decisionmaking level,” the corpo276
ration as a juridical person may be held liable under the ATS. An
en banc opinion of the Ninth Circuit reviewing ATS claims against
Rio Tinto recently reached a similar conclusion based in part on the
lack of specific language within the ATS or any legislative history suggesting congressional intent to limit the ATS to claims against natural
277
persons.
These cases are among the most recent in a long line of claims
brought against U.S. and foreign multinationals in the United States
278
under the Alien Tort Statute.
The Alien Tort Statute, which was
enacted by the first Congress as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, confers subject matter jurisdiction on U.S. federal courts to hear tort
claims by foreign plaintiffs based on violations of the “law of nations”
or customary international law, such as piracy, crimes against human279
ity (including genocide), and torture.
The ATS is a statute of
280
unique provenance and has few parallels in other legal systems.
The ATS was revived, ironically enough, by the Second Circuit in the

273

Exxon Mobil, 654 F.3d 11.
Id. at 50 (“[T]he ATS ‘by its terms does not distinguish among classes of defendants.’” (quoting Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S.
428, 438 (1989))).
275
Flomo, 643 F.3d 1013.
276
Id. at 102−13.
277
Sarei, 671 F.3d at 747–48.
278
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (giving district courts “original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations”).
279
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713, 715, 724 (2004); see also id. at 730
(“[T]he ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action.”). Customary international law may be defined as the “[p]ractice of states . . . that law
‘made over time by widespread practice of governments acting from a sense
of legal obligation’ . . . and ‘gradually ripening into a rule of international
law.’” Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d at 42 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) cmt. b.; LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS
BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 33 (2d ed. 1979); The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677
(1900)).
280
See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (calling the ATS a
“legal Lohengrin” of which ”no one seems to know whence it came”).
274
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281

case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala. Since 1997, it has become a primary
vehicle for foreign plaintiffs seeking compensation for violations of
282
international law.
Footnote twenty in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court’s
only interpretation of the ATS, lies at the heart of Kiobel and the cases
challenging its holding. It states: “A related consideration is whether
international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private
283
actor such as a corporation or individual.” The question of whether
Sosa requires a threshold jurisdictional finding that corporate liability
is itself a “specific, universal, and obligatory” norm of customary in284
However, all of
ternational law is itself a matter of some dispute.
the appellate decisions reviewed here conclude that post-Sosa, the
question of who can properly be named a defendant is a matter that
285
must be determined with reference to customary international law.
Based on an analysis of international criminal law and the practice of international criminal tribunals from Nuremburg to the International Criminal Court, the Second Circuit panel in Kiobel concluded that individuals, but not corporations, are “subjects of customary
286
international law” : “‘subjects’ [of international law are] those that,
to varying extents, have legal status, personality, rights, and duties under international law and whose acts and concerns are the principal
287
concerns of international law.” Thus equating personhood with status as a “subject” of international law, the court concluded that only
individuals have such a status and therefore only they bear rights and
288
duties under international human rights law.
The Second Circuit
281

630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d in part and
rev’d in part, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002) (accepting, for the first time, ATS claims
against a corporate defendant).
283
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 n.20.
284
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 131 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732, and related authorities); see Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (quoting
with approval lower court authority that “actionable violations of international law
must be of a norm that is specific, universal, and obligatory” (internal citation omitted)); see also Julian G. Ku, The Curious Case of Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort
Statute: A Flawed System of Judicial Lawmaking, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 353, 357−63 (2011)
(analyzing precedent and commentary on the issue).
285
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 128–30 & n.33 (analyzing Sosa and later appellate authorities
on this issue).
286
Id. at 148−49.
287
Id. at 126−27 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES, pt. II, at 70) (emphasis added by the court).
288
Id. at 148−49.
282
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thus interpreted international law as mandating a view of the corporation diametrically opposed to the one adopted by the Court, as a mat289
ter of domestic law, in Citizens United. The issue of corporate liability
under the ATS and the related question of the corporation’s status
under international law were squarely presented to the Supreme
Court on appeal, and at the time of this writing are pending resolu290
tion.
Kiobel illustrates the classic aggregate entity view of the defendant-parent corporations as fictional entities. The Second Circuit emphasized that corporations act through individuals, and finding no
clear principles of attribution within international law, concluded
that corporations are incapable of committing crimes under interna291
tional law.
This implies that while the corporation as a “juridical
292
person” has a legal identity, it has no “real” personhood apart from
that of the individual executives and employees through whom it operates. Accordingly, the court concluded that moral culpability for
any violations of international law must rest, if at all, with the individ293
ual directors and officers of the named corporate defendants.
The extent to which non-state actors, including individuals and
corporations, are properly considered “subjects” of international law
294
is a matter of some debate. Indeed, the Flomo and Exxon Mobil opinions, as well as amici curiae writing in support of the Kiobel plaintiffs,
strongly dispute the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the Nuremberg trials specifically and the status of the corporation under cus-

289
To be sure, as Judge Cabranes noted in Kiobel, the doctrinal basis for the two
holdings is entirely distinct. Id. at 118, n.11 (“The history of corporate rights and obligations under domestic law is, however, entirely irrelevant to the issue before us—
namely, the treatment of corporations as a matter of customary international law.”).
290
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d. Cir. 2010) (raising the
questions of whether corporate civil tort liability under the ATS is a merits question
or an issue of subject matter jurisdiction, and (ii) whether corporations may be sued
as a defendant under the ATS for violations of the law of nations), cert. granted, 132 S.
Ct. 472 (2011).
291
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 118–20, 147–49.
292
Id. at 147−49.
293
Id.
294
See, e.g., MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 175−77 (5th ed. 2003) (surveying the debate); JENNIFER A. ZERK, MULTINATIONALS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY 72−76 (2006) (also surveying the debate and noting that there is now
“much greater recognition of the role of ‘non-state actors’ [including] companies . . .
within the international community”); Ku, supra note 284, at 377, 373–89 (surveying
the literature on corporate liability under international law and arguing that “the
question of private corporation liability is far from universally settled under customary international law”).
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295

tomary international law generally. The D.C. Circuit, in particular,
goes to great lengths in Exxon Mobil to trace the history of corporate
296
Both find that
civil and criminal liability under international law.
under international law, the corporation is itself a bearer of rights
297
and duties, which can be breached by its agents.
The Ninth Cir298
cuit’s en banc opinion in Sarei v. Rio Tinto concurs.
These cases,
then, reflect a fundamentally different view of the nature and status
of the corporation under international law, and one that more closely
resembles a real entity approach.
Consistent with standard tort and contract principles, the adjudication of ATS claims necessitates a strict entity approach that focuses on the tortfeasor directly responsible for the harm caused. Because of the evidentiary challenges of connecting a parent company
or its directors and officers directly to those harms, however, the majority of ATS cases rely on aiding and abetting, conspiracy, or other
299
indirect theories of liability.
None of these approaches reach the
enterprise level because all disaggregate liability within the corporate
group. Accordingly, all of the recent appellate decisions similarly approach the issue of liability in tort from an entity perspective, focusing on the indirect liability of the defendant parent companies rather
than on the corporate enterprise as a whole.
Despite the inevitability of an entity-level view in ATS cases, a real enterprise approach is relevant to courts resolving emerging issues
in these types of disputes and others concerning the human rights
practices of MNEs. First, as many commentators have noted, the
courts have thus far failed to develop a consistent standard for indi295
See, e.g., Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir.
2011) (noting that I.G. Farben, the German chemical cartel, was dissolved and its assets made “available for on the authority of customary international law”); Doe v.
Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see also Brief for Nuremberg Scholars Omer Bartov et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011) (No. 10-1491), 2011 WL 6813570.
296
See Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d at 41−54.
297
See Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1017–21; Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d at 41 (“[T]he court
may assume that individuals acting as agents of a corporation violated substantive international law norms. The question is whether a corporation can be made to pay
damages for the conduct of its agents in violation of the law of nations.”).
298
671 F.3d 736, 747–48. (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (adopting the reasoning of
Judge Leval’s concurrence in Kiobel), cert. petition filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3335 (U.S. Nov.
23, 2011) (No. 11-649) .
299
See, e.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244
(2d Cir. 2009); Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F3d 1305, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008);
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Andrei
Mamolea, The Future of Corporate Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: A Roadmap, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 79 (2011).
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rect liability in ATS cases, “leading to confusion in the lower courts
300
and persistent uncertainty for litigants.”
At present, the Second
Circuit has adopted a high standard requiring proof that the corporate
301
defendant acted with “purpose” to aid and abet the tortious conduct,
while the D.C. Circuit in Exxon Mobile Corp. espouses a lower
“knowledge” standard as the test most consistent with customary in302
ternational law.
Yet standard agency principles aimed at attributing liability within a single corporation become more challenging when applied globally. As Judge Posner observed in Flomo, the question of the scope of
corporate liability⎯that is, how far vicarious liability on a respondeat
303
Equally difficult is the
superior theory may extend⎯is uncertain.
question of whether the intent or knowledge of agents of indirect
subsidiaries of a corporate defendant can be imputed through a
304
chain of ownership or control to a defendant parent corporation.
The purpose and knowledge standards differ significantly in this respect. Unless the defendant parent corporation directed the challenged conduct, the purposeful intent of agents far lower in the corporate structure is unlikely to be shared across an enterprise and
must be imputed to higher-level corporate agents for liability to attach. In contrast, if a knowledge standard applies, the fact that decision-making, disclosure, risk management, and other internal controls integrate information-sharing across a firm implies that plaintiffs
may be able to satisfy a knowledge test for affiliated entities on an enterprise theory without having to establish its imputation from one
affiliate to the next within the corporate group. If in fact the D.C.
Circuit’s interpretation of customary international law as establishing
a “knowledge” standard is correct, then its application may turn on

300
Chimène I. Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 HASTINGS
L.J. 61, 62 (2008) (discussing the challenge “multiple and overlapping legal orders”
pose to claims of corporate complicity in human rights violations generally and this
point in particular).
301
See Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 260, 277 (“[A] defendant may be held liable under
international law for aiding and abetting . . . when the defendant . . . “does so with
the purpose of facilitating the commission of that crime.”) (Katzmann, J., concurring); Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 582 F.3d 244, at 258−59 (adopting Khulumani’s
approach).
302
Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d at 32.
303
Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1020 (7th Cir. 2011)
(“[T]he theory [of respondeat superior] attenuates when the employees include local
residents of Third World countries.”).
304
See Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 582 F.3d. at 161 (noting the challenges such
issues present when the defendant corporation is a minority shareholder).
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whether courts see defendants that are related entities from an enterprise or an entity perspective.
In addition to questions of intent, the potential for corporate
civil liability under international human rights law, apart from the liability of any individual director or officer, implies a collective moral
obligation whose source cannot be examined from an aggregate enterprise approach. Legal claims in other areas of international law,
such as environmental law, may also soon require the courts to view a
defendant corporation (read “corporate group”) holistically as a “real
305
enterprise.”
These questions have gained new urgency in light of recent international initiatives to promote greater accountability for multinational corporate groups through multilateral collaborative enforcement networks, voluntary or self-regulatory monitoring structures,
and stakeholder-driven strategies that intersect with traditional regu306
lation. For example, on June 16, 2011, the United Nations formally
endorsed the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, a
framework under which businesses have an ongoing due diligence
obligation with respect to the human rights impacts of the business’
307
operations.
Recent trends toward enterprise-wide risk manage308
ment are similarly grounded on an understanding of the corporate
group as a “real enterprise.” Even if limited liability and traditional
common law principles are presumed, the fact that corporate groups
now face real reputational, legal, and ultimately economic risks from
human rights violations abroad on an enterprise-wide basis calls for

305
The ATS has been used as a jurisdictional “hook” to ground claims under international environmental law, although none have succeeded to date. See, e.g.,
Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 1999). See generally
Luis E. Cuervo, The Alien Tort Statute, Corporate Accountability & the New Lex Petrolea, 19
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 151 (2006) (analyzing the applicability of the ATS to environmental
torts).
306
See generally ANN MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); PierreHughes Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits, 34 YALE J. INT’L L.
113 (2009); Blair, Williams & Lin, supra note 179.
307
See Special Rep. of the U.N. Secretary-General, Guiding Principles on Business
and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/documents/issues/business/A.HRC.17.31.pdf
(identifying
MNEs’ “obligations to respect” human rights). Other examples include the United
Nations Norms for Transnational Corporations, the Global Compact, and the OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. See What Is the Global Impact, U.N.: GLOBAL
IMPACT, www.unglobalcompact.org (last visited Apr. 20, 2012); supra notes 254−55.
308
See, e.g., Michelle Harner, Barriers to Effective Risk Management, 40 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1323 (2010) (reviewing such trends before and after the global financial crisis).
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further research on allocation of oversight responsibility and related
governance questions as applied to corporate groups.
D. Enterprise Principles: A Synopsis
The selected cases reviewed here show that judges’ views of the
nature of the firm⎯both of the corporate form generally and, more
importantly for present purposes, corporate groups⎯affect their application of legal rules and their conclusions about policy choices
raised by corporate activities. At the same time, how it does so is less
clear. The cases reveal a lack of systematic and consistent application
of corporate theory even within discrete doctrinal arenas. In Citizens
United, this discontinuity appears within the majority opinion itself.
While these examples may suggest that judges are simply drawing on
the theory that best suits their intended conclusion, they clearly show
that corporate theory is not determinative in a mechanistic sense and
that there is a need for courts to use greater care when drawing on
corporate theory.
The opinions also demonstrate that even if limited liability and
other fundamental characteristics of the corporate form are presumed, enterprise perspectives lead to new ways of approaching decisions involving corporate groups. However, even where the nature of
the corporation and the scope of its rights and obligations are directly at issue, the Court has failed to directly confront the distinctions
between the conduct of individual corporate entities and that of a
larger enterprise or group, as the First Amendment cases make clear.
Part of the challenge courts face is that there are, as of yet, few clear
rules regarding the attribution of responsibility for collective decision-making within and across a corporate group. While the Court
has been willing, as in Citizens United, to endorse the concept of collective rights, such as the right to “speak” as a firm, Janus Capital and
Kiobel highlight the difficulty of doing so across formal entity and jurisdictional boundaries. Finally, Kiobel emphasizes a third tension,
unresolved by the Court, between the rights and duties of the corporation under domestic and international law.
The cases do, however, suggest the key questions that should be
part of the analysis. First, should corporations enjoy the same rights
and bear the same duties as natural persons? If so, should enterprise
principles apply to the corporate group or should the analysis be limited to the level of the entity? And finally, should the law reflect an
aggregate enterprise that focuses on shareholder (and/or other constituents’) interests or is a real enterprise approach more consistent
with common group organizational structures or “universal” moral
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norms? No one perspective is suited for all doctrinal domains. However, a consistent approach within each doctrinal domain can be furthered by a clear recognition of what alternative visions of the corporation imply. At present, inconsistent understandings within even a
single case can lead to incoherent decisions if not recognized and
weighed in reaching a conclusion.
Relatedly, these cases illustrate the need for clearer standards for
delimiting the bounds of the corporate group. Again, this can be
309
done differently across discrete doctrinal areas, consistent with specific policy goals and other factors discussed in Part IV below. Concepts of control clearly are foundational, but as Janus Capital shows,
traditional definitions of formal legal control based on common
ownership may not be sufficient to define the bounds of accountability in all contexts as corporate structures evolve. In such cases, statutory regimes may even reach to include contractual arrangements
within the ambit of the “corporate group.”
A new possibility might be to define the corporate group as a
subset of control relationships characterized by some level of ownership and perhaps other functional characteristics, such as shared personnel, joint authority over strategy, and other factors suggesting the
group’s function as a single coordinated enterprise. Other approaches might look beyond control to a group’s delimitation of its
own external boundaries as a basis for allocating responsibility toward
310
third parties.
If the Supreme Court rules in Kiobel that corporate
groups and other corporations are in fact “persons” as a matter of
customary international law, there will be an even greater need for
clear rules that predictably allocate legal responsibility among the
corporate group itself, its parent or headquarters, and/or constituent entities across jurisdictions.
IV. GENERAL PRINCIPLES: DEVELOPING THE LAW OF CORPORATE
GROUPS
In sum, if the corporate group might be viewed differently for
First Amendment purposes, for example, than in contract law or under securities regulations, then legislatures and courts face a number
of challenging questions within each doctrinal arena: 1) When and
309
See, e.g., Teubner, supra note 35, at 89−91 (arguing that the complexity of corporate groups justifies such variation).
310
To the extent a group functions as an economic organization, it necessarily establishes certain boundaries even if not corresponding to formal legal categories. See
ALDRICH, supra note 92, at 42 (defining “organizations” as “goal-directed, boundarymaintaining, and socially constructed systems of human activity”).
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how should legal rights and duties attach, if at all, to the corporate
group as a whole? 2) Should rights and duties inherent to the group
displace, supersede, or complement the legal rights and duties of the
group’s constituent firms? 3) Should the parent corporation serve as
the “proxy” for the enterprise or are alternative means of allocating
responsibility on an enterprise basis possible and desirable? The following is a preliminary effort to propose basic guiding principles that
might aid (though not complete) such an inquiry.
A. An Entity or Enterprise Perspective?
Existing canons of statutory interpretation offer a sound starting
point for determining whether certain rights and obligations should
apply at the level of the corporate group. For example, under the securities laws, as noted earlier, conceptions of control, which help define the boundaries of the corporate enterprise, should be interpreted broadly in light of the investor protection objectives of the
securities regulations. Since companies are already required to satisfy
consolidated reporting requirements and related accounting rules,
consistency and predictability can be enhanced, not undermined, by
directing regulation at the level of the consolidated group. Therefore, if as in Janus Capital, questions regarding the existence, scope,
and obligations of a corporate group arise in an area of the law that
already applies to corporate groups on an enterprise basis, such as
the securities laws, then enterprise principles might be usefully
adopted.
In addition to considering the policy goals of the doctrinal arena
at issue, whether an entity or enterprise-level analysis is most appropriate should also be determined based on the nature of the dispute⎯namely, whether the matter involves external claims or claims
within the group itself. For example, corporate tax rules in the United States apply on an enterprise-wide basis, but particular rules that
deal with conduct internal to the organization and are deemed to be
necessary to the fair function of the corporate tax system, such as
transfer pricing rules, apply on an entity basis that focuses on each
311
constituent member of the corporate family.
Likewise, the Upjohn
rule governing attorney-client privilege under federal common law is
not applied in disputes between a parent and the subsidiary or in disputes between the corporation and its shareholders. In such cases,
the conflicting interests of the parent and subsidiary trump the
shared interests of the corporate group that might be relevant where
311

See 26 U.S.C. § 482 (2006).

HARPER-HO_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

946

6/24/2012 12:07 PM

[Vol. 42:879

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW
312

the claim is being raised by an unrelated third party. At the risk of
over-simplifying, in some cases, the “internal”/”external” distinction
might also be viewed jurisdictionally. For example, where a matter
raises strictly local concerns unique to a certain entity in the corporate family, an entity-level approach might be most relevant, whereas
enterprise-level rules might offer a better fit in the context of crossjurisdictional business operations.
Third, pragmatic concerns matter. The Supreme Court recently
emphasized these considerations in Hertz Corp. v. Friend, a case concerning the question of corporate citizenship for purposes of diversity
313
jurisdiction.
There the Court stressed that rules extending to the
enterprise level must be clear and susceptible of predictable applica314
tion, yet they must also be adaptive. Taking account of the dynamic
nature of corporate group structures is particularly important because the boundaries of the corporate group are constantly chang315
ing.
Adaptive standards then might best be set as presumptions
that foster clarity and predictability where bright line tests cannot be
adopted, but which can be overcome if particular group structures
require.
Established jurisdictional principles in the international arena
and the presumption against the extraterritorial application of federal statutes may dictate the potential scope of an enterprise-based
316
rule. In this regard, Reuven Avi-Yonah has developed a useful ma312
See In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 359 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Neither [understanding of the] attorney-client privilege [that may apply to the corporate group] is effective in adverse litigation between the former clients [(i.e., affiliates)].”); Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970) (establishing this
exception to the general federal common law rule).
313
130 S. Ct. 1181, 1192 (2010) (establishing that for diversity jurisdiction purposes, the corporation’s principal place of business is its headquarters or “nerve center”).
314
Id.
315
See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 13; ALDRICH, supra note 92, at 180–
83; see also In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d at 367−68 ( “[B]ecause parentsubsidiary relationships often change, having [different] default rules for whollyowned, solvent subsidiaries, and not-wholly owned or insolvent subsidiaries, seems
unwieldy. . . . Because of the need for clarity and certainty in privilege law creating
multiple, ever-shifting default rules would be unwise.” (citing Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981)).
316
See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (discussing the
presumption against statutory extraterritoriality); see also Developments in the Law—
Extraterritoriality, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1226 (2011) (surveying recent developments in
the law of extraterritoriality). But see Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REV. 1019 (2011) (arguing, in part, that principles of international jurisdictional law may urge or mandate extraterritorially and should be implemented accordingly within U.S. law).
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trix for analyzing whether entity-based or enterprise-based regulatory
approaches should be adopted in different areas of the law by domestic jurisdictions, either as home-states or host-states for multinational
317
corporate groups.
He argues that an entity approach that recognizes established limited liability principles is optimal where the law
318
deals primarily with local issues, such as tort and contract.
AviYonah suggests that where a law’s purpose is best furthered (or can
only be furthered) by an enterprise approach, this result can be
achieved through the extraterritorial application of a corporation’s
home country law in areas where there is broader consensus among
319
jurisdictions and less likelihood of conflicting law and policy.
Examples he cites in this area include tax, anti-corruption laws, and
320
prohibitions on child labor. Avi-Yonah posits that an enterprise approach can also be achieved by international harmonization in areas
of the law that are inherently global in scope, but where consensus
among nations and support of the global business community are
321
lacking.
Examples of laws he places in this category include anti322
As his effort shows,
trust and employment discrimination laws.
concerns about the potential direct and indirect extraterritorial effects of enterprise-based rules can be predictably resolved under
principles of comity and existing private international law doctrines.
Finally, if an enterprise-level rule is adopted, there are certain
normative implications that must be recognized. The most important
of these is the need to explain the source of any moral obligation that
applies to complex organizations. At the risk of eliding a deep and
multifaceted debate, enterprise-based rules may facilitate a closer
correspondence between the legal rights and duties of the corporate
group than an entity-level approach. If large corporations, that is,
corporate groups, are more like natural persons with respect to certain rights and duties, then they should be treated from a “real enterprise” standpoint under the law. For example, where MNEs influ323
ence law-making internationally and enjoy the right to bring claims

317

See Avi-Yonah, supra note 250.
Id. at 13–16.
319
Id. at 17.
320
Id. at 17–26.
321
Id. at 11–12, 26.
322
Id. at 28–31.
323
See generally STEPHEN TULLY, CORPORATIONS
(2007).
318

AND

INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING
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against sovereign states on an enterprise-wide basis, there is justification for requiring them to bear commensurate obligations. Where
this is not the case, entity-based rules and other distinctions between
natural and juridical persons may be equally appropriate.
B. Allocation of Rights and Duties Within the Corporate Group
Because the efficiency of modern corporate group structures derives from certain features of the corporate form, namely, limited liability, the free transferability of shares, and the power to vote shares
held in another corporation, any application of theories of corporate
groups to particular areas of the law should preserve these attributes
of the corporate form. Standard limited liability rules, in particular,
enable creditors to serve as specialized monitors of the particular assets (including subsidiaries and/or their respective assets) of the corporate group against which they have a claim without the added costs
325
of monitoring the entire enterprise.
Existing legal rules establishing respect for corporate formalities, explicit contracts, and entity
principles as the default rules therefore should continue to apply to
the constituent entities within a corporate group as well.
Phillip Blumberg has rightly observed that “intra-enterprise attribution of rights or liabilities among the constituent companies of
the group does not [“and we may add, should not] “flow from the legal acceptance of an overriding concept of the group as an economic
326
entity.” Nonetheless, the collective commercial activity represented
by the group must inform any assessment of the relationship of its
constituent companies. Given this starting point, entity principles
that respect the formal legal boundaries of the corporation are most
324
Dispute settlement clauses contained in all model investment agreements and
in the bilateral investment treaties (BITs) that follow them provide for host-state consent to arbitrator-investor claims against the host state before ICSID. MUCHLINSKI,
supra note 136, at 694–98, 703–46. International investment agreements, including
BITs, often identify the investments covered by the agreement to include investments
owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a company that is a national of a party
to the agreement; thus, the investor may include the foreign parent and any intermediary investment vehicle. See id. at 678–81 (discussing the identity of investors and
investments covered by these agreements). This enterprise approach gives standing
to parent corporations to bring claims against host governments in international arbitration. See 22 U.S.C. § 1650a (2006); Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18,
1965,
17
U.S.T.
1270,
575
U.N.T.S.
159,
available
at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf; see
also MUCHLINSKI, supra note 136, at 674–702 (discussing general principles governing
BITs).
325
See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 57.
326
See Blumberg, supra note 2, at 300.
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useful in determining the contractual and other rights of the constituent affiliates within the group, while analyses that involve third-party
claims arising out of the collective activity of the group may suggest a
more appropriate context for the application of enterprise principles.
The latter cases might arise more readily, for example, if the corporate group has adopted an integrated decision-making structure or
otherwise functions as a coordinated enterprise. A real enterprise
approach permits attribution of legal rights and duties at both levels,
whereas any attribution to the enterprise or firm under an aggregate
perspective must be allocated to its constituent entities.
C. Attribution to Parent Corporations and Alternatives
The scope of this Article does not permit consideration of when
and where U.S. law might recognize the corporate group as an independent bearer of rights and duties. Acceptance of joint and several
liability within the group based on shared decision-making, control,
or other factors is perhaps more likely. However, on the question of
whether the parent corporation or another affiliate should be
deemed the sole “proxy” for the enterprise, Hertz offers some baseline
guidance. It defines the “principal place of business” or “nerve center” of a corporate group for jurisdictional purposes, as the seat of di327
rection, control, and coordination.
Ultimately, the goal of any attribution rule should be to hold decision-makers accountable via direct and indirect incentive structures.
Where a corporate group has a unitary “nerve center” in the jurisdiction that has full authority over the issue at hand, treating that entity
as a proxy for the corporate group is an appropriate solution. For
public companies, the listed entity generally represents the group of
which it is a part in the listing jurisdiction. Statutory requirements,
like those governing public companies, might also determine whether the listed entity, even if it is not a “nerve center,” should represent
the group on this kind of unitary attribution theory. Where a corporation adopts a decentralized or polycentric management structure,
current law offers less guidance. However, standard principles of
agency law, conceptions of comparative or joint liability in tort, and
contractual allocations of risk within the corporate group offer possible sources of attribution rules that might be usefully adapted to such
firms.

327

Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1192 (2010).
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V. CONCLUSION
Historically, new legal forms and corporate governance rules
have emerged when the comparative advantage of new organizational
328
modes has already been validated by the market.
In other words,
“legal structures merely reflect the underlying economic substruc329
ture.”
Corporate groups, and indeed, multinational corporate
groups have now become the dominant organizational form globally,
yet only in specific regulatory domains has a legal framework for the
corporate group been developed. Given the rapid changes in firm
organizational and management structures and in the broader economy, establishing the “corporate group” as a formal legal entity under
state law may not promote greater flexibility or efficiency. There is
nonetheless a critical need for renewed consideration to those areas
of the law where the corporate group matters and to areas of corpo330
rate law where existing rules may need to be adapted.
In considering such rules, theories of corporate groups can play
a formative role. However, traditional theories of the corporation
that have been articulated only at the entity level continue to be applied by courts and analyzed by scholars as if they can be translated
seamlessly from the entity to the enterprise level. Yet unlike a discrete business entity, the “enterprise” reflects an economic reality
more than a legal one. At the level of theory, the effect has been a
gap between the literature articulating theories of corporate identity,
described and defined most often with respect to a single legal entity,
and work on established theories of the firm. Moreover, recurrent
debates over the nature of corporate identity as a matter of theory
have begun to lose their original connection to the realities of corporate practice in a world dominated by corporate groups. At the level
of practice, then, when courts and policymakers look to corporate law
to inform the development of legal rules in other doctrinal domains,
whether in constitutional law, securities law, or human rights, they
have been left without a coherent framework for understanding the
nature of the corporate group when the issues at hand implicate relationships beyond formal legal boundaries.

328

Teubner, supra note 35, at 69.
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 85 (1992).
330
Although space does not permit consideration of concrete responses here,
some potential applications of the theories developed in this Article to corporate law
are addressed in a separate article. See Virginia Harper Ho, Rethinking the Governance of Corporate Groups (Mar. 1, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
author).
329
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This Article has advanced a framework for extending traditional
understandings of corporate identity to the level of the corporate
group and illustrated how conceptions of the corporate group can
impact critical case outcomes and policy choices. It also bridges
foundational literature on the theories of the firm and current thinking on corporate identity and “personhood.” However, rather than
derive a Grand Theory of the corporation to apply in all contexts, the
more modest effort here has been to develop different theories that
offer a better basis for reasoned choices in different doctrinal domains where the multi-dimensional nature of the corporate group is
an important factor in the formulation and application of law.
Of the two primary approaches, the real enterprise view and the
aggregate view, the former seems to offer the best fit with the multidimensional nature of the corporate group. At the same time, an aggregate enterprise approach may better explain contractual relationships among businesses that are not based on equity ties. The
complex nature of the modern corporation and of corporate groups
makes it unlikely that any single view will be well-suited to address the
range of policy concerns that arise in different legal domains, and in
fact, a multifaceted approach may be more true to reality. Each perspective also offers a different view of the corporate group and brings
with it different normative underpinnings and implications that must
be taken into account as new organizational practices and structures
emerge.
The role of theory then, is not to drive the new reality but rather
to articulate it, forming a kind of stepping stone in the evolution of
331
the law. Through this “reality construction,” perspectives of the
corporate group can be developed that better take account of its
simultaneous complexity and unity as an economic organization. At
the present moment, the continued integration of global business
organizations and the world economy calls for new modes of thinking
about corporate identity and accountability. It is high time to revisit
these questions from the perspective of the corporate group.

331

See Sugarman, supra note 24, at 13, 20 (introducing this perspective on the role
of theory).

